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I. INTRODUCTION
The debate between laissez-faire economic philosophers and proponents
of government regulation has dominated the field of economics. Followers
of the latter philosophy frequently identify the miraculous recovery of the
American economy fostered by the New Deal in their arguments.'
Champions of the free market are quick to point out the New Deal would
have been a colossal failure without the economic stimulant of the Second
World War.2 Embedded in that historic era in one field of American
* Adjunct Professor, John Jay College of Criminal Justice; J.D., St. John's University School
of Law; LL.M., New York University School of Law. I am forever in debt to Professor William E.
Nelson-every student should be so fortunate to have as great a mentor and friend. Many thanks to
Christina Guzman and the editors of the University of Miami Business Law Review for their excellent
work; to the American Society for Legal History for allowing me to present some of these ideas at their
2006 conference; to Jennifer Klein for reading a draft of the article and providing excellent insights; to
Robert Carrozzo for great discussions on Keynes, economics and many other topics; and to my wife Erin
and daughters Katherine and Abigail for their love and for sharing their lives with this article.
I Works that highlight the successes ofthe New Deal include RONALDEDSFORTH,AMERICA'S
RESPONSE TO THE GREAT DEPRESSION (2000); DAVID M. KENNEDY, FREEDOM FROM FEAR: THE
AMERICAN PEOPLE IN DEPRESSIONANDWAR 1929-1945 (1999);JAMES S. OLSON, SAVINGCAPITALISM:
THE RECONSTRUCTION FINANCE CORPORATIONANDTHE NEWDEAL, 1933-1940 (1994) ;JORDANA.
SCHWARz, THE NEW DEALERS: POWER POLITICS IN THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT (1994); JASON SCOTr
SMITH, BUILDING NEW DEAL LIBERALISM: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PUBLIC WORKS (2006).
2 Works that are critical of the New Deal include GARYDEAN BEST, PRIDE, PREJUDICE AND
POLITICS, ROOSEVELT VERSUS RECOVERY, 1933-1938 (1990); JIM POWELL, FDR'S FOLLY: How
ROOSEVELT AND HIS NEW DEAL PROLONGED THE GREAT DEPRESSION (2004); GENE SMILEY,
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business is a success story born at the crossroads of the free market and
economic regulation. The New Deal's transformation of the American
mortgage-that venerable economic instrument foremost in a vast majority
of Americans' financial lives-shows the great potential of government
regulation by economic philosophers with real-life entrepreneurial
experience. The New Deal's business-friendly, unobtrusive regulation of
the American housing market fostered a financial triumph. Indeed, the
nation of homeowners, unrivaled in the world, and the trillion dollar
industry that has grown around the American mortgage, can look to a five-
year period in the 1930s when a few bright New Dealers ushered in a
revolution in mortgage lending.
Today, the soundness of the institutional changes brought about by the
New Deal will be tested like at no time since the Depression. In the
twenty-first century, American economists must look not just to the stock
market but to the mortgage market to determine the financial health of the
economy.3 Currently, the American economy sits in fear of a potential
crash of said mortgage market caused by speculative investment in
increasingly questionable loans-generalized as the sub-prime market.4 As
an interesting sign of a possible shift in the winds, the current liquidity
crunch5 in the American economy is partly the result of the stock market
being impacted by events in the mortgage market.6 The reverberations of an
RETHINKING THE GREAT DEPRESSION (2002). For collections of essays containing both sides of the
arguments, see FIFTYYEARS LATER: THE NEW DEAL EVALUATED, (HARVARD SITKOFF, ED.) (1984);
REFLECTIONS ON THE GREAT DEPRESSION, (RANDALL E. PARKER, ED.) (2003); THE NEW DEAL AND
THE TRIUMPH OF LIBERALISM, (SIDNEY M. MILKIS ANDJEROME M. MILEUR, EDS.) (2002).
3 Justin Fox, Subprime's Silver Lining, TIME, Mar. 22, 2007, available at http//www.time.com/
time/magazine/article/0,9171,1601838,00.html. One explanation of the growth of the mortgage market
as a national indicator appeared in Time recently:
Declining global interest rates left investors searching for anything that would pay higher
yields. Eager to oblige, Wall Street investment bankers devised ever cleverer ways to package
ever riskier loans into high-yield securities. And mortgage lenders came up with ever more
creative loan terms to attract customers. This lured "unsophisticated borrowers who had
difficulty fully understanding how these products would affect them when interest rates rose
and housing prices edged off," says Eugene Ludwig, a former top banking regulator who now
runs Promontory Financial Group.
Id.
4 Michael Liedtke, High-Risk Mortgages Become Toxic Mess, WASH. POST, Aug. 11, 2007, available
at httpV/www.washingtonpost.conwp-dy/content/article/2007/08/10/AR2007081001768.html.
s Justin Fox, Th7 End ofEasy Money, TIMEJuly3O,2007,avaiableathttp://www.time.com/time/
magazine/article/0,9171,1645150,00.html.
6 Tim Paradis, Stocks Plunge on Rising Credit Anxiety, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Aug. 9,2007. Fora
summary of how the stock market, mortgage market and American economy as a whole are intertwined,
see A Sub-Prime Primer, TIME, Mar. 15, 2007, available at httpV/www.time.com/time/magazine/
article/0,9171,1599698,00.html:
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American economic crash are being felt throughout the world-a world
where America's strongest export may be its mortgages.7
New Deal-era federal enterprises are not considered the direct cause of
the sub-prime catastrophe.8 However, the Federal National Mortgage
Association (Fannie Mae), along with its brother company, the Federal
Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac), deserve their share of the
blame. The lending revolution they ushered in allowed other private
lenders, and Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac themselves, to take risks and
insure mortgages that the federal mortgage market of the 1930s-or of any
other decade-would not have tolerated.9  Casting blame aside, recent
federal action to take over Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac indicates that at
least one vestige of that great era of government initiative may become a
casualty of its own success and subsequent financial exuberance."0 This
WHEN HOMEOWNERS CAN'T PAY... Borrowers with poor credit and unusual loans
have often taken on more debt than they can handle. And if rates rise, they are vulnerable to
default and even foreclosure.... MORTGAGE LENDERS GET HAMMERED... Many
lenders resell their high-risk mortgages to investment banks. If defaults rise, the lenders are
often forced to buy back the bad loans, which hurts earnings and stock prices ...
INVESTMENT BANKS LOSE BUSINESS ... The firms that buy the loans usually
repackage them and sell them as securities (for a profit, of course). As securities get riskier,
there are fewer buyers. That means lower profits.... INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS ARE
EXPOSED... Banks, hedge funds, insurers and mutual funds have been buying the risky
bonds because they promise high rates of return. As defaults spread, that promise evaporates.
... AND THEY FLEE THE STOCK MARKET.... The mortgage storm plus slowing
consumer spending lead investors to look for safer bets than stocks.
Id.
7 Adam Smith, How a U.S. Credit Crunch Went Global, TIME, Aug. 10, 2007, available at
http://www.time.con/time/business/article/0,8599,1651865,00.html; Julia Werdigier, Europeans are
Wondering About Subprime Exposure, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 2007, available at
httpV/www.nytimes.con/2007/08/1 1/business/worldbusiness/1 lregulate.html.
Fox, supra note 3 (arguing in support of FHA and Fannie Mae).
9 Fannie Mae, along with Freddie Mac, which was created in the 1970s as an offshoot of the
work of Fannie Mae, have not been without criticism:
It was during the long housing boom that the seeds of destruction were sowed for Fannie and
Freddie. They appeared to be very profitable, so pressures mounted for them to find ways
to finance housing for poorer Americans, often living in areas where banks had historically
been hesitant to lend.... At the same time, the private mortgage industry was becoming
more and more reckless in its own lending... As those standards deteriorated, there was
pressure on Fannie and Freddie to relax their own standards, both to remain competitive and
to meet the Congressional goals. In some cases, the goals were met by buying subprime
mortgage securities sold by private lenders.
Floyd Norris, The Dilemma of Fannie and Freddie, N.Y. Times, Sept. 8, 2008, available at httpV/
www.nytimes.con/2008/09/08/business/08norris.html?pagewanted= print.
10 Stephen Labaton & Edmund L. Andrews, In Rescue to Stabilize Lending, U.S. Takes Over
Mortgage Finance Titans, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8, 2008, at Al. As a result of the sweeping federal action,
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac will be placed in "a government conservatorship, much like a bankruptcy
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article will discuss the early beginnings of the American mortgage market.
Beyond mere nostalgia, a revisit to the birth of the national mortgage market
will show the spirit and philosophy behind the Depression-era mortgage
industry. This look back in time will expose the degree to which the
mortgage market has deviated from the original intentions. Perhaps through
an examination and reminder of where the mortgage market revolution
began, we can see in the past the potential in the market for future recovery.
Between 1933 and 1938, the pieces were put in place to transform the
concept of mortgage lending in the United States. This article will review
the crisis in the American mortgage market at the outset of the Depression
and focus on the system-wide changes that occurred in the mortgage
industry through New Deal legislation. It will begin with a history and
discussion of the Home Owners' Loan Corporation (HOLC), a small,
unheralded New Deal relief agency created to assist defaulting borrowers
and failing banks. The article will examine how the success of this agency
led a few economic experts to create the Federal Housing Administration
(FHA). This agency brought permanent institutional changes in the form
of an improved, standardized mortgage document, more uniform and
cohesive mortgage practices and introduced mortgage insurance. This
article will discuss the FHA's innovations, which were built on the
experiences of the HOLC, and then show how, as security in the American
economy increased through these changes and lenders felt more confident
in borrowers' ability to pay back their loans, economists attempted to
enhance liquidity through the creation of a market for these (now) safe
investments in the form of the Federal National Mortgage Association
(Fannie Mae). After 1938 and over the course of the next seventy years these
economic innovations-this New Deal for the American mortgage-
democratized home ownership and, at times, propelled the entire American
economy. Whether anticipated or not, an investment revolution was born.
H. THE CRISIS IN AMERICAN MORTGAGE LENDING
On April 13, 1933, President Franklin D. Roosevelt submitted a bill to
Congress "to provide emergency relief with respect to home mortgage
indebtedness."1 Forty days prior, the President proclaimed fear as
America's greatest enemy and commenced a revolutionary period of social
transformation through extraordinary legislation known as the "Hundred
reorganization." Id. The entities will lose much of what made them private companies and possibly
usher in a Treasury takeover. Id.
11 Roosevelt's Bill Proposing Refinancing of Mortgages for Home Owners, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 14, 1933,
at 2 [hereinafter Roosevelt's Bill].
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Days. " 12 The New Deal was still in its infancy. A mere one month prior to
the President's proposal to assist homeowners, FDR announced the "bank
holiday" and closed American banks. 3 Under the bi-partisan Emergency
Banking Act, America's banks were now re-opened under government
supervision.14 Although a catastrophe in capitalism was averted, mere
government reactions to the emergency would not suffice. A structural
overhaul of the American economy was needed. By this time, legislation
unparalleled in its social magnitude had passed or been proposed creating
agencies to rescue agriculture (the Agricultural Adjustment Agency), to
employ and assist the unemployed (the Civilian Conservation Corps. and
the Federal Emergency Relief Administration, respectively), to support
American industry (the National Recovery Administration), to insure bank
deposits (the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation), and to harness the
potential of hydroelectric power (the Tennessee Valley Authority)."
The crisis in mortgage delinquencies and foreclosures equaled the
greatest of the Great Depression's dilemmas. Hence, the President proposed
the mortgage relief bill after only forty days in the White House. Why was
rescuing the foundering mortgage industry so vital a part of the entire New
Deal recovery program to warrant inclusion among the other great acts of
the pivotal Hundred Days?
When President Roosevelt delivered his first Inaugural Address,
mortgages on residential homes in the United States were being foreclosed
at a rate of one thousand per day. 6 Banks, suffering from the scores of
foreclosures, were closing their doors unlike at any other time in history. 7
Massive unemployment combined with a precipitous drop in property
values brought about these unprecedented results.' 8 However, these obvious
causes told an incomplete story. The magnitude of failed mortgages and
failing banks was a symptom of inherent defects in the very foundation of
American mortgage lending--defects that made the collapse inevitable.
The pre-New Deal American mortgage was made by a homebuyer with
a large down payment-in excess of 30 percent of the value of the
12 KENNEDY, supra note 1, at 134-53. The author gives a comprehensive account of the
Hundred Days, which he describes as "a masterpiece of presidential leadership unexampled then and
unmatched since." Id. at 140.
13 Id. at 135-37.
14 Id.
is Id. at 153, 144, 151 and 148-49.
16 KENNETH T.JACKSON, CRABGRASS FRONTIER: THE SUBURBANIZATION OF THE UNITED
STATES 193 (1985).
17 OLSON, supra note 1, at 8-9 (stating "[w]hen the financial dust cleared for 1930, more than
1,350 commercial banks had closed. It was the worst year in United States financial history").
18 JACKSON, supra note 16, at 193.
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home-with a local institution. 19 The savings deposits of people in the
community supplied the money lent by these institutions; mortgage money
was at the mercy of local thrift.20 Decisions disbursing these limited funds
among various potential borrowers underscored the insularity of the
mortgage system as it stood at the outset of the Depression. Common sense
judgments based on a person's reputation and standing in the community
determined obtaining a mortgage in this day before Social Security numbers,
national credit agencies and computerized records. 21 Additionally, appraisal
of land, a vitally important business decision in identifying safe collateral
investments, required an intimate knowledge of peculiar land values in
thousands of diverse American cities and towns. National appraisal
standards were as yet unknown.
The mortgage as it existed in the 1930s was anywhere from five to ten
years in length.' Payments were made of interest only, at a rate of usually
no less than 8 percent. 23 Upon maturity a balloon payment of the entire
unreduced principal was due.2a Most homeowners lacked sufficient funds
to pay off the entire mortgage at maturity; thus borrowers would be
compelled to refinance and begin the process anew, with another five to ten
year mortgage.25 Self-amortizing mortgages, where equal monthly payments
gradually reduce and eventually pay off the entire principal, were rare.26
19 KENNEDY, supra note 1, at 370.
20 See Michael H. Schill, The Impact of the Capital Markets on Real Estate Law and Practice, 32 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 269, 270 (1999); Michael H. Schill, Uniformity or Diversity: Residential Real Estate
Finance Law in the 1990s and the Implications of Changing Financial Markets, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 1261, 1263-64
(1991).
21 Kenneth G. Gunter, Computerized Credit Scoring's Electo n the Lending Industry, 4 North Carolina
Banking Institute 443, 444-45 (2000). Although the concept of credit reporting has existed in America
since the nineteenth century, credit reports were not readily available to local banks before the computer
age. Often, the expense of credit reports was the greatest hurdle. "[T]he lenders who, due to costs,
chose not to use these types of systems were forced to rely primarily upon the businessjudgment of their
lending officers to approve loan applicants." Id.
22 JACKSON, supra note 16, at 196. KENNEDY, supra note 1, at 370.
23 KENNEDY, supra note 1, at 370.
24 JACKSON, supra note 16, at 196. KENNEDY, supra note 1, at 370.
25 KENNEDY, supra note 1, at 370.
26 Amortization was popular among building and loan and savings and loan organizations.
However, these institutions were limited geographically to whom they could lend-usually only within
one hundred miles from their locations. Buildings and loans only gave mortgages to members who
deposited in their institutions. These limited deposits from the community created the mortgage money
lent. For an overview of the Building and Loan Industry, see DAVID L. MASON, FROM BUILDING AND
LOANS To BAIL-OUTS: A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN SAVINGS AND LOAN INDUSTRY, 1831-1995
(2001). Or, think ofthe scene in "It's aWonderful Life" where this guy named Tom has "$242 here [the
Bailey Bros. Building and Loan]" and he wants to withdraw all of his money because "$242 is not going
to break anybody," but George tells him, "You're thinking of this place all wrong. As ifl had the money
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Beyond the expense of a new mortgage every five years, the need for
frequent refinancing was a particular problem in times of tight money when
the supply of funds was limited. The cost of mortgage money increased as
a result.27 At the outset of the Great Depression, the need for mortgage
money created by this inefficient system went from problematic to
catastrophic.
According to Winfield W. Riefler, an economic advisor to the President's
Executive Council, and a draftsman of the National Housing Act, the boom
in home construction in the 1920s increased the amount of debt held in
short-term mortgages and created "the sort of financing which is bound to
develop into a very serious crisis."28 The Depression led to a precipitous
drop in property values and panic among lenders. "[L]enders became
excited about the value of their security and asked for heavy curtailments [in
creating new mortgages]. 29 These "heavy curtailments" combined with a
"serious liquidity problem" caused by the removal of savings by depositors
reeling from the early effects of the Depression and in desperate need of
cash, created a scarcity in mortgage money.30 "[Thus] the mortgage market
froze at the very time when people were least able to curtail [borrowing]."31
In this way, the lack of mortgage money for people in desperate need to
refinance mirrored the cash-flow problem caused by the margin purchasing
of stock-a fad of the 1920s-and the collapse caused by the call to meet the
margin (pay back borrowed money used to purchase stock devalued by the
crash), when people were least able to afford it.32 With thousands of
unemployed homeowners facing foreclosure, hundreds of banks failing and
a scarcity of available mortgage money, the structurally unsound
back in a safe. The money's not here. Your money's in Joe's house right next to yours. And in the
Kennedy house, and Mrs. Macklin's house, and a hundred others. Why, you're lending them the money
to build, and then, they're going to pay it back to you as best they can." IT'S AWONDERFUL LIFE (Liberty
Pictures 1947).
V JACKSON, supra note 16, at 196 (indicating the homeowner was periodically at the mercy of
arbitrary and unpredictable forces in the money market).
28 National HousingAct: Hearingon S. 3603 Before the S. Comm. on Banking and Currency, 73d Cong.
2,50 (1934) [hereinafter National HousingAct Hearings of 1934]. Mr. Riefler explained: "We went through
a building boom from 1922 to 1929, in which we added enormously to our mortgage debt. That
building boom was not financed in a sound way. In general the mortgages were not amortized. People
expected not to pay them off but to renew them by refunding in the market." Id.
29 Id.
30 C. LOWELL HARRISS, HISTORYAND POLICIES OF THE HOMEOWNERS' LOAN CORPORATION
8 (1951).
31 National Housing Aa Hearings of 1934, supra note 28, at 50.
32 ROBERT S. MCELVAINE, THE GREAT DEPRESSION: AMERICA, 1929-1941 47(1993).
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Depression-era mortgage market was crumbling. "[T]he home-financing
system was drifting toward complete collapse."
33
III. THE HOME OWNERS' LOAN ACT OF 1933
The bill that President Roosevelt proposed on April 13, 1933, was
reprinted on the second page of The NewYork Times the following day.34
It was modestly described as a proposal "to set up machinery for refinancing
home mortgages." 3' The goals of the bill were summarized in the heading
of the proposed legislation: "to refinance home mortgages [and] to extend
relief to the owners of homes who occupy them who are unable to amortize
their debt elsewhere." 36 The Home Owners' Loan Corporation (HOLC)
would be created by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board to achieve these
goals. The new Corporation would be capitalized up to a maximum of $200
million, funded by the Reconstruction Finance Corporation.37 The HOLC
would issue its own bonds to local lenders in exchange for delinquent
mortgages in their portfolios. These bonds were tax exempt (no federal,
state or local tax), paid a maximum interest rate of 4 percent (guaranteed by
the federal government), and held a maximum eighteen-year maturity.
38
Loans could be made on one to four family dwellings for 80 percent of the
appraised value of the property or less.
39
Displaying the immediacy of the Hundred Days and the urgency of the
mortgage crisis, a mere one week after FDR's proposal, the Home Mortgage
Subcommittee of the United States Senate Committee on Banking and
Currency would hold hearings on the bill titled "The Home Owners' Loan
Act of 1933."' Senator RobertJ. Bulldey of Kentucky, as chairman of the
33 JACKSON, supra note 16, at 193. Mr. Riefler, in his testimony before the Senate Banking and
Currency committee, used the term "collapse" as well to describe the state of the mortgage market at the
outset of the Depression. National Housing Act Hearings of 1934, supra note 28, at 50.
34 Roosevelt's Bill, supra note 11.
35 Id.
36 Id.
37 HARRISS, supra note 30, at 11. The Reconstruction Finance Corporation was created in
January 1932, by President Hoover. Id. Its purpose was to make low interest loans to banks and
businesses. Id. Historian James S. Olson described its goal as follows: "to rejuvenate private money
markets with injections ofgovernment money... [to] stimulate business production and employment."
OLSON, supra note 1, at 14-15.
M HARRISS, supra note 30, at 11.
39 The HOLC would exchange bonds for mortgages for three years. OLSON, supra note 1, at
12. HOLC mortgages were to be in first position on the property and cash loans could be made to assist
in payment of real estate taxes. Id.
40 Home Owners' Loan Act: Hearing on S. 1317 Before the S. Subcomm. on Banking and Currency, 73d
Cong. 1 (1933) [hereinafter Home Owners' Loan Act Hearings].
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Subcommittee on Home Mortgages, presided over the two-day hearings on
the Home Owners' Loan Act.4' Horace Russell, General Counsel for the
Federal Home Loan Bank Board in Atlanta and a draftsman of the bill, was
the first witness.42 Mr. Russell explained at the outset that the HOLC would
take over the mortgage origination power of the Federal Home Loan Banks
that "ha[d] proved to be utterly unworkable." 43 The Federal Home Loan
Bank Act of 1932 gave these federal institutions direct lending power to
originate loans.44 Mr. Russell explained why this power, placed in the act at
the last minute, proved to be a complete failure: "such direct lending and a
conservative reserve system are inconsistent."4 5 The lending practices
proved to be too cautious; loans were made "only where the risk was slight"
and as a result "[e]xactly three were approved."' Some sort of intermediary
organization without the conservative tendencies of a federal reserve had to
do the job.
Mr. Russell explained that the HOLC would issue bonds and place
mortgages on homes worth a maximum of $10,000, thus spreading the
Corporation's limited $200 million original capitalization among the greatest
number of houses. 7 However, he admitted that no standard had yet been
established for appraisals to determine what constituted a $10,000 house.48
Although the HOLC would contribute toward creating "an organized
system of home financing" it could not become that system.49 "[Tihe
Government will not propose to go behind all of the home mortgages... in
the country."
5 0
As the witness proposed alternative opportunities to encourage investor
involvement in the HOLC bonds,5' Senator James Couzens of Michigan
quickly interjected: "As I understand, the whole purpose of this bill is to
protect the home owner and not the investor."52 Mr. Russell did not directly
41 Id. at 5
42 Id.
43 Id. at 5-6.
44 JACKSON, supra note 16, at 196.
45 Home Owners' Loan Act Hearings, supra note 40, at 6.
46 JACKSON, supra note 16, at 194 (emphasis added). Obviously, those three refinances did not
reverse the downhill slide of housing conditions." Id. However, Mr. Jackson warns the reader "we
should not minimize the satisfaction that those three families received from this evidence of federal
compassion." Id.
47 Home Owners' Loan Act Hearings, supra note 40, at 6.
48 Id. at 12.
49 Id. at 11.
50 Id.
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support nor disagree with the senator's perspective. 53 This understanding
of the purpose of the proposed legislation shows a complete misunder-
standing of mortgage lending. This aversion for federal assistance to
entrepreneurs fails to acknowledge the symbiotic relationship between
lenders and borrowers. Mass foreclosures of entire lender portfolios would
evict hundreds of thousands from their homes and bankrupt banks by the
thousands. Financing for future mortgages would nearly vanish with huge
numbers of banks out ofbusiness. Owning one's own home would become
an impossible dream. Revitalization of the mortgage industry required
assistance to both borrowers and lenders. Therefore, to support legislation
that gave assistance to homeowners exclusive of lenders was a doomed
strategy.
Mr. Russell understood the need to assist both borrowers and lenders
in his support for enhancing the marketability of the bonds issued by the
HOLC in exchange for failing mortgages. "[T] here are other institutions
that would take these bonds if they had a market for them and [convert]
them into cash."5 4 Increasing liquidity for local lenders would allow the
origination of more loans and ease the tight money crisis. The HOLC
would initiate a chain reaction by issuing marketable bonds that could be
traded to increase the supply of money for future mortgage lending-a
remedy diminishing the need for federal involvement. "Therefore, if [the
bonds] could be made more marketable the act would operate very much
more effectively. "s' Remarkably, Mr. Russell predicted the future of
mortgage lending enhanced by the secondary market for mortgages.
Although ideas were discussed showing a glimpse of the near future of
mortgage lending, much was needed in 1933 to bring these ideas to fruition.
Walter S. Schmidt, representing the National Association of Real Estate
Boards, testified on the importance of and the need for amortization.
Although he found the Home Owners' Loan Act insufficient to "meet[] the
exigencies of the situation"56 he supported its amortization principles.
Mortgages paid off over fifteen years would give people the opportunity to
gradually own their homes. The constant refinancing caused by the short-
term mortgage system "for what should be a long-term investment [was] ...
53 See id.
54 Id. at 17.
5 Id.
56 Id. at 44. The witness favored grander legislation. Id. Mr. Schmidt, who predicted "anarchy"
unless actions were taken to fix the mortgage system, proposed expanding the Federal Home Loan Bank
and renaming it the "Federal mortgage bank." Id. This newly christened institution would act as "a per-
manent discount system for long-term financing." Id. at 43-45. Likewise, economist Henry Woodhouse
of New York City felt the bill, although "a noble one" was insufficient to meet the crisis. Id. at 76.
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one of the greatest injustices that is done to the homeowner."57 Not all the
senators were convinced of the need for amortization. Senator Couzens
opined, "[T]here is no reason why a man should not pay for his house in
less than 30 years, or 20 years, if he exercises thrift." 8 In the senator's mind,
amortization was simply a form of reckless installment buying seen with
appliances and other luxuries.
Charles O'Connor Hennessy, President of the Savings and Loan Bank
of the State of NewYork, was openly against the Home Owners' Loan Act.
He saw an intrinsic flaw in the diversity of state mortgage laws. "You cannot
successfully build a Federal mortgage system upon mortgages assembled
under 48 different State systems." 9 Although Senator Alben Barkley
suggested that a national law on the subject of mortgages might resolve this
issue-a prediction of sorts to the mortgage standardization that would take
place in the 1970s-Mr. Hennessy was entirely against any federal
involvement. 6" Perhaps he viewed such involvement, even improvements,
as a threat to the diminished profits of the Depression.
Mr. Hennessy felt the proposed HOLC would provide no relief and
involve the federal government in "dubious liabilities."6' He expressed "the
gravest doubt that those bonds [issued by the HOLC in exchange for
mortgages] will have any substantial market at all."'62 With concern over the
bonds' "marketability" and their corresponding liquidity, most lenders
would simply "unload[] upon this [Corporation], and indirectly upon the
Government of the United States, the 'cats and dogs' of the mortgage
business in this country."' Thus, in Mr. Hennessy's opinion, the HOLC
would become a warehouse of unwanted, unworkable mortgages, for which
lenders would receive illiquid bonds creating no new mortgage money.
Not all of the opinions on the proposed Home Owners' Loan Act were
as negative. The April 16, 1933, issue of The NewYork Times featured an
article by Joseph P. Day dissecting the current problems with the mortgage
market and supporting the proposed legislation as a step toward a potential
solution.64 The author agreed that mortgages needed to become long-term
57 Id. at 63.
58 Id.
59 Id. at 66.
60 As the witness consistently disagreed any time any senator mentioned some of the benefits
of the legislation, Senator Barkley suggested, "You arejust opposed to this whole scheme?" Id. at 70. The
witness agreed, adding he had been "consistently opposed to it." Id.
61 Id. at 70, 72.
6 Id. at 71.
63 Id. at 70.
64 Joseph P. Day, Mortgage Relieffor Home Owners; Possibilities of Federal Legislation Are Discussed,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 1933, at RE1.
2008]
12 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAWREVIEW [Vol. 17:1
investments to remove the "uncertainty" and "overhead" of constant
refinancing.65 Mr. Day predicted "the real estate mortgages of the future"
would be paid off over extended periods of time, "for twenty-five years or
longer."' This improvement would create "more desirable, more market-
able" mortgages since "steady amortization" meant the gradual payment in
full of the mortgage itself and unencumbered home ownership.67 This
"stability" in mortgage lending would make mortgages more attractive
investments that "would command a higher price" in the market.68 In the
optimistic opinion ofMr. Day, a greater supply of mortgage money available
meant future mortgages would "command a lower rate of interest."
69
Obviously, numerous political, economic, and emotional factors dictate
interest rates. However, what is certain is that if investors felt more secure
in purchasing mortgages, additional funds would be infused into local banks,
and additional mortgage money would be available to more people.
Mortgage lending in the twentieth century was shaped by this idea of
enhancing the marketability of mortgages through improvements to the
mortgage itself and the potential of mortgages as commodities.
OnJune 13,1933, exactly two months to the day the bill was proposed,
President Roosevelt signed the Home Owners' Loan Act in front of the
members of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board and SenatorJoseph Taylor
Robinson of Arkansas, the bill's sponsor.70 The Senate Hearings of the
preceding April lasted only two days, in order to "speed action."7' The bill
passed the House by a vote of 383 to 472 and the Senate without a recorded
vote.73 Upon signing, President Roosevelt declared the law was "another
important step toward the ending of deflation."74 Recognizing the need for
65 Id. (recalling a conversation twenty years earlier with railroad magnate August Belmont: "If





69 Id. Mr. Day explained this in terms of supply and demand: "In the long run, of course, the
interest rate on any security is determined by the law of supply and demand. Mortgage money seeks a
certain interest level.. Make the mortgage [a] more attractive security by freeing it from uncertainty,
provide for amortization... and it will at once become more desirable, more marketable and... command
a lower rate of interest." Id.
70 Roosevelt Signs Home Loan Bill: Asks Foreclosure Moratorium Until Machinery Is Set Up to Aid
Owners, N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 1933, at 8 [hereinafter Moratorium].
71 HARRiss, supra note 30, at 9.
72 Id. at 11. See also H.R. 77 CONG. REc., pt. 3, 73d Cong. 2474-2507, 2567-88 (1933).
73 H.R. 77 CONG. REc., pt. 3, 73d Cong. 2474-2507,2567-88 (1933); H.R. 77 CONG. REC., pt.
5, 73d Cong. 4974-75 (1933).
74 Moratorium, supra note 70.
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wholesale assistance to lenders and borrowers, the President acknowledged
"the act extends relief not only to people who have borrowed money on
their homes but also to their mortgage creditors."75 Contrary to historical
stereotypes, the liberal President Roosevelt appreciated the need to assist big
business to accelerate recovery and foster prosperity. Further, the President
asked for cooperation from lenders in the spirit of united action to tackle the
emergency: "I appeal to mortgage creditors.., until full opportunity has
been given to make effective the refinancing provisions of the home mort-
gage act that they abstain from bringing foreclosure proceedings."76 As The
NewYork Times correctly reported, this was nothing short of a presidential
plea for a foreclosure moratorium until the HOLC was up and running.77
IV. THE HOME OWNERS' LOAN CORPORATION
Although the task before the Home Owners' Loan Corporation-"to set
up machinery for refinancing home mortgages, 78--seemed simple and
straightforward, the revolutionary new Corporation given the task of
introducing novel answers to old questions such as financing homes faced
a massive undertaking. The HOLC's challenge to create and introduce
economic innovation was similar in concept to those of its dozens of
alphabetically-nicknamed sister New Deal organizations.
The HOLC administrators approached the challenges before them with
four central concepts gleaned from the hearings: (1) Bolster lenders by
freeing them from the failing mortgages in their portfolios; (2) assist
borrowers by refinancing and substituting short-term interest-only mort-
gages with long-term amortized mortgages; (3) create certainty in invest-
ments through standardized appraisal methods; and (4) enhance liquidity for
lenders by converting mortgages from stagnant liens into marketable
commodities. This multi-faceted approach of four interdependent ideas was
pro-business and pro-consumer; one can imagine the draftsmen worried and
hoped it would work as well in practice as it worked in theory.
After the rapid creation of a wide infrastructure, the Home Owners'
Loan Corporation was open for business. A decentralized system of local
offices, totaling 458 locations at its operating peak staffed by as many as
20,000 employees disbursed throughout the United States, received




78 Roosevelt's Bill, supra note 11.
79 HARRISS, supra note 30, at 140.
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accessible, reaching "a great majority of its borrowers by local telephone,
local transit, or a short automobile drive."' The HOLC was widely
publicized upon its introduction. The public was familiar with the lending
practices of the new Corporation through various radio addresses and press
statements."' AJune 18, 1933, article in the Real Estate section of The New
York Times drafted by the Brooklyn Real Estate Board answered frequently
asked questions about applying for loans and the corporate makeup.' The
HOLC helped its own publicity with the issuance of a pamphlet describing
its functions and practices in August 1933. 3
The progress of the Chicago location of the Home Owners' Loan Cor-
poration was followed closely by the Chicago Daily Tribune and serves as an
informal example of the early days of the HOLC. William G. Donne, the
Illinois manager of the HOLC, took his oath of office in Washington the week
ofJuly 12, 1933.84 Mr. Donne provided "large stacks of application blanks at
the Chicago City State Bank and Trust" so that on opening day completed
applications could be processed.' However, these applications would not be
handled in order of submission: "The man who needs federal aid the most is
going to get the quickest relief."' In fact, during the first thirty days of
operation, the branch would only entertain "acute distress cases" for relief"s
Mr. Donne hoped this policy would prevent "the riotous scene" on the
opening day of the Detroit office, where applicants began lining up at 4 a.m.
and quickly turned into a "mob scene." s In Chicago, public interest was
tremendous, with applicants requesting 200 applications a day.s9
The HOLC opened its Chicago office at 134 North La Salle Street on
August 1, 1933. 90 The response was overwhelming, with 15,000 home
owners waiting in line to receive applications on the first day.91 A picture of
80 Id.
sI Id. at 15 (explaining that efforts were made to acquaint the public with the new agency though
radio addresses by SenatorJames F. Byrnes and Louis McHenry Howe). In the tri-state NewYork, New
Jersey, Connecticut area, Congressman Fred A. Hartley of NewJersey explained the new law on Station
WOR onJune 17, 1933. House Group SeeksAid on Mortgages, N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 1933, at 12. It is likely
that similar radio addresses occurred throughout the United States.
82 Essential Factors in Home Loan Bill, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 1933, at RE1.
83 HARRISS, supra note 30, at 15.
84 Home Owners Loan Office to Function Soon, CHI. TRIB., July 16, 1933, at A7.
85 Al Chase, Home Owners In Distress Get First U.S. Loans, CHI. TRIB., July 20, 1933, at 23.
86 Id.
87 Al Chase, Home Loan Wil Take Only Past Due Cases First, CHI. TRIB., July 27, 1933, at 22.
98 Id.
89 Id.
90 Al Chase, Thousands Ask U.S. Home Loans on First Day, CHI. TR1B., Aug. 2, 1933, at 9.
91 Id. (revealing that 2,000 persons came to the office that day with questions, 5,000 letters were
received requesting applications, and 3,000 persons went to two satellite locations).
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scores of those in line under the caption, "Asking Aid of Uncle Sam,"
appeared in the paper a few days later, next to a photograph of William G.
Donne, Senator William H. Dieterich and a seemingly overwhelmed office
worker opening one of the mountains of letters on her desk.' Mr. Donne,
in a radio address that week, described two types of loans, one which would
receive HOLC assistance, and one which would be rejected.93 The primary
requirement was "distress." If foreclosure was imminent, action would be
quick: "A loan probably will be made within the next two weeks."94 By the
fourth day of business, the HOLC treasurer was suffering from "writer's
cramp," necessitating the appointment of an assistant treasurer to help sign
the "eighteen thousand interim certificates for loans."95
The first mortgage negotiated by the Chicago office of the HOLC was
on the home of "Mr. and Mrs. Theodore Burgwald, at 10628 Avenue F,
South Chicago." 96 In fact, the Chicago Daily Tribune, under a picture of the
"six room brick bungalow," claimed this was the first mortgage issued by the
HOLC in the entire United States.97 Whether this is true or not is
unknown, particularly since the date of the mortgage closing is missing from
the article; it is likely that articles similar to this one appeared in scores of
America's newspapers as publicity, giving hope to readers accustomed to
seeing only bad economic developments for several years. What is certain
is that in exchange for a $4,000 mortgage on premises at 10628 Avenue F, the
South Chicago Savings bank accepted HOLC bonds with a 4 percent return
and the Burgwalds did not lose their home, which they had owned since
1919.98 These fortunate homeowners refinanced their distressed mortgage
with the United States of America as the new lender, through the Home
Owners' Loan Corporation.99 This new $5,000 mortgage (covering the
original principal, accrued interest, and taxes) was to be paid in $40 monthly
installments amortized over the next fifteen years-all for only $35 in
closing costs. 1°° Other success stories appeared in the Chicago Daily
Tribune throughout the ensuing months. 10' One can imagine local papers










101 For just a sampling of similar "success story" articles in the Chicago Daily Tribune, see Al
Chase, Donne Fights to Save Family From Eviction, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 19, 1933, at 28; Al Chase, H.O.L.C.
Rescues Miller Familyfrom Eviction, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 20, 1933, at 23; 3 Flat, Cottage Owners Given Home
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throughout the United States saw similar stories of the Home Owners' Loan
Corporation saving the nation's homeowners.
By August 14, 1933, two months after creation of the Home Owners'
Loan Corporation, a survey in Washington, D. C., reported that nationwide,
the Corporation already saved 3,000 homes from foreclosure, with 13,300
applications being processed."° The survey also reported nationally, "courts
are showing a willingness to hold up foreclosures and evictions pending
action by the [Corporation]."'0 3 Almost overnight, the HOLC was being
utilized to the advantage of distressed homeowners-and unscrupulous
opportunists. Twenty-five firms in Chicago and five firms in NewYork had
been indicted for charging bogus fees to assist in filling out and processing
HOLC applications. 1
Many important issues confronted Mr. Donne, along with most other
local and state HOLC chairmen, such as enhancing the marketability of the
Corporation's bonds'05 and convincing local courts to slow the process of
foreclosure and eviction to allow the HOLC to work.1°6 Although various
branches met with different degrees of success, the story did not end happily
for Mr. Donne, who resigned from his position on December 18, 1933, in
response to "charges of irregularity" against his administration of the
HOLC, including patronage and imposing excessive appraisal fees."°7
LoanAid, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 31,1933, at 24; 7 State Offices Ready to Lend On Homes Today, CHI. TRIB., Aug.
29, 1933, at 22. The New York Times was also not above this enthusiastic championing of New Deal
victories. See 318 Foreclosures in Homes Averted; Activities in New York State are Detailed by the Home Owners'
Loan Corporation, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17, 1933, at 39.
102 U.S. Loans Save Foreclosure on Homes of 3,000, CHI. DAILYTRIB., Aug. 15, 1933, at 7.
103 Id.
104 Al Chase, Threatens Suit Against 25 For Home Loan Fees, CHI. DAILYTRIB., Aug. 15, 1933, at
22.
105 See Philip Hampson, Home Loan Bond Market Arouses Banks' Interest, CHI. DAILYTRIB., Aug.
20, 1933, at A8; Making Market for Home Bonds Proves Hard Job, CHI. DAILY TRIB., Aug. 23, 1933, at 24;
U.S. Will Create Marketfor New Home Loan Bonds, CHI. DAILYTRIB., Sept. 5, 1933, at 24. Additionally,
bond companies, such as Chas. E. Quincy and Co., advertised offerings of HOLC eighteen-year, 4
percent bonds which would materialize in 1951. DisplayAd 24, CHlI. DAILYTRIB., Sept. 11, 1933, at 24.
Even a woman's apparel store, the Boston Store, advertised to bondholders of the HOLC that said bonds
would be accepted at par value with the purchase of merchandise. DisployAd 69, CHI. DAILYTRIB.,Jan.
27, 1935, at Dl.
106 See Al Chase, Building-Loan Delay is Urged on Foreclosure, CHI. DAILY TRIB., Oct. 3, 1933, at
26; Al Chase, Chancellors and H.O.L.C. Head To Discuss Foreclosure Situation, CHI. DAILYTRIB., Aug. 20,
1933, atA12; A] Chase, Municipal Court Head Promises Home OwnerAid, CHI. DAILYTRIB., Aug. 22,1933,
at 22; Home Loan Head Asks Halt in Foreclosures if U.S. Aid is Sought, CHI. DAILY TRIB., Oct. 21, 1933, at
26.
107 Donne Removed as Manager of Home Loan Here, CHI. DAILY TRiB., Dec. 19,1933, at 1.
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Officials from Washington and the new director of the local HOLC
restructured the Chicago branch; no criminal charges were brought.'
While the local branches fought the daily battle of saving the American
people from foreclosure one house at a time, a larger project was being
carried on at the national level. One section of the Home Owners' Loan
Act, added by the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, required the
formation of uniform rules for appraisal throughout the United States."° As
C. Lowell Harriss, an historian of the Home Owners' Loan Corporation
writing in the 1950s, identified, "the success of the HOLC... hinged on its
appraisal policies."" 0 Appraising properties above their real value would
expose the Corporation to great risk in the event of foreclosure of an
undervalued property. Below market valuation of a property would cause
unfair denials of applications otherwise entitled to assistance.
The appraisers' greatest hurdle was to decipher the nuances of local land
values. This challenge led the HOLC to hire appraisers from the localities.
"Centralization with full-time appraisers was undesirable, since familiarity
with local conditions was essential.""' So, "part-time fee appraisers" chosen
by state managers in the many local HOLC offices were hired; they received
a payment of $5 per home regardless of a property's appraised value, to dis-
courage inaccurate valuations for the purpose of payment. 1 2 Full-time
appraisers were retained in large cities and to oversee the work of part-
timers.
113
To supervise a diverse system of appraisals spanning the nation, "uniform
procedures and standards had to be established and enforced.""4 ByJanuary
1934, appraisal standards were in place; a form was created with ninety-eight
questions."5 It contained "a warning against willful overvaluation" and
108 Al Chase, Zander Named HOLC Manager To Clean House, CHI. DAILYTRIB., Dec. 20, 1933,
at 7. Following an investigation, Mr. Donne was able to avoid criminal charges. Ousts 8 Donne HOLC
Men, More Heads May Fall, CHIC. DAILY TRIB.,January 4, 1934, at 6.
109 HARRISS,supra note 30, at 11. In the same NewYork Times article reporting passage of the
Home Owners' Loan Act, a review of the new law by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board Chairman
William F. Stevenson acknowledged: "In view ofpresent unsettled conditions as to real estate values, the
appraisal problem is a difficult one for the corporation." Moratorium, supra note 70, at 8.
110 IARRSS, supra note 30, at 41.
II Id., at 42.
112 Id. at 43 & n.4.
113 Id. at 43-44. "ByJune 1935, over 6,000 applications for appraisal positions had been examined
and rated, about 1,300 qualifying for salaried, and 2,700 for fee, positions." Id. at 44.
114 Id. at 43 (noting that regulations were prepared on hiring procedures, through consultation
with the American Institute of Real Estate Appraisers).
115 Id. at 45. Examples of questions included: "give the building code classifications, if any, the
material used (brick, frame, stucco, and the like), the quality of the structure (cheap, fair, good or
expensive), the number and kinds of rooms, repairs necessary to protect the structure." Id. at 46.
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required the appraisers to provide photographs of the property, a location
map, dimensions of the lot and additional information so supervisors could
"visualize the territory surrounding the subject property." n 6
The HOLC appraisers established a rating system of four color-coded
categories from the most desirable neighborhoods, color-coded green, to the
least desirable neighborhoods, color-coded red. u 7 The significance of a
property receiving any one of the four ratings was understood uniformly
throughout the country. This standardized system allowed informed
business decisions as to the worthiness of investments anywhere in the
nation, regardless of familiarity with the nuances of local property values.
As Kenneth T. Jackson has identified: "The ultimate aim was that one
appraiser's judgment of value would have meaning to an investor located
somewhere else." 118 Local appraisers implemented the system throughout
the nation, first dividing cities and then giving each section the requisite
color-coding." 9
A terrible corollary to the benefits ofuniformitywas the institutionaliza-
tion and perfection afforded to the invidious process of "redlining"-the
very term a product of the HOLC color-code red for least desirable
properties. 120 Never before could mortgage investors determine the racial
or ethnic makeup ofa given neighborhood with such certainty. Discrimina-
tion in mortgage-lending decisions became a tragic science under the
uniform appraisal practices of the HOLC.12 1
One significant difference between the Home Owners' Loan
Corporation and other New Deal agencies was in the former's ability to
avoid constitutional controversy. While agencies such as the National
Recovery Administration and the Agricultural Adjustment Administration
were embroiled in the titanic constitutional struggle between President
Roosevelt and a conservative Supreme Court bloc, immortalized in history
116 Id. at 45.
11 JACKSON, supra note 16, at 197-98. The four categories from best ("A") to worst ("D") were
as follows: The first grade (A) color-coded green properties were "new, homogenous and 'in demand
as residential locations in good times and bad' "; the second grade (B) color-coded blue properties were"
'still desirable' areas that had 'reached their peak,' but were expected to remain stable for many years";
the third grade (C) color-coded yellow properties were "definitely declining"; and the fourth grade (D)
color-coded red properties were "areas 'in which the things taking place in [category] C areas have
already happened.'" Id.
Ms Id. at 197.
119 See id.
12 Id.
121 See id. at 197-203 (describing how redlining practices were perfected through the information
provided by the HOLC). But see Amy E. Hillier, Redlining and the Home Owners' Loan Corporation, 29 J.
URB. HIST. 4,394-420 (2003) (arguing that discriminatory lending occurred in what were later identified
as red-color coded neighborhoods well before the HOLC).
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as the four horsemen of the apocalypse, the HOLC went about unscathed
-but not unnoticed. The constitutionality of the HOLC was challenged in
several cases brought to the Supreme Court.
Kay v. United States was the first challenge to the constitutionality of the
Home Owners' Loan Act.22 Gertrude Kay was the holder of a second
mortgage against a New York home whose owner applied for and received
HOLC assistance.' 3 Ms. Kay agreed to accept the bonds of the HOLC in
exchange for repayment of the mortgage. 124 While "executing the consent
to accept bonds" to satisfy the outstanding principal, the defendant falsely
inflated the amounts outstanding, claiming the total sum of$1240 was owed,
when the actual total amount due was $435.125 In challenging her conviction
for "knowingly making false statements with intent to mislead " 126 Ms. Kay
argued that Congress lacked the authority to create the HOLC. 127 In a
unanimous decision 28 upholding the conviction, written by Chief Justice
Charles Evans Hughes, the court avoided the issue of the HOLC's
constitutionality. 29  The Chief Justice held that the petitioner lacked
standing: "When one undertakes to cheat the Government ... by false
statements, he has no standing to assert that the operations of the
Government in which the effort to cheat or mislead is made are without
constitutional sanction."
130
The next opportunity the Supreme Court had to review the
constitutionality of the HOLC, Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe, involved
the question of whether a state tax on an employee of the HOLC
represented "an unconstitutional burden upon the federal government."
131
The majority opinion found the state tax on the income of the federal
122 303 U.S. 1 (1938).
123 Id. at 5.
124 Id.
125 Id.
126 Id. at 5-6.
127 Id. at 6.
128 Justice Cardozo took no part in the consideration and decision. Id. at 10.
129 Id. at 6.
130 Id. In the decision below, the Second Circuit Court ofAppeals held that the creation of the
HOLC was within the constitutional power of Congress: "The power 'to lay and collect Taxes * * * and
provide for the * * * general welfare of the United States * * * is explicitly conferred and necessarily
contains the implied power ofappropriation." United States v. Kay, 89 F.2d 19,21 (1937). Additionally,
"[t] he power 'to borrow money on the credit ofthe United States' is granted without express limitation."
Id. at 21. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals then looked to a pattern of cases holding constitutional
"the expenditure of public funds for a public purpose" and, after briefly noting the $21 billion in
outstanding mortgage debt in 1933, concluded the HOLC was created for a "national public purpose ...
to relieve the distress of foreclosure." Id. at 22.
131 306 U.S. 466 (1939).
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employees constitutional. 132 The decision, drafted by Justice Harlan Stone,
asserted the constitutionality of the HOLC. 133 With no argument, the Court
cited its decision in Kay v. United States, where the court avoided the issue
entirely, to "assume that the creation of the Home Owners' Loan Corpora-
tion was a constitutional exercise of the powers of the federal govern-
ment."' 34 Perhaps this decision, coming after Justice Owen Roberts's
famous "switch in time" in West Coast Hotel v. Parish was just another
example of the new Supreme Court approach, deferential to economic
regulation. 135
However, in dissent,JusticeJames Clark McReynolds andJustice Pierce
Butler, staunch conservatives and intransigent enemies of the New Deal,
implicitly supported the constitutionality of the HOLC. 136 They took issue
with the majority opinion's conclusion that a state tax on employees of a
federal agency was not an "unconstitutional burden" on the federal agency
itself but merely "a non-discriminatory tax on income applied to salaries [of
a HOLC employee] at a specified rate."137  This view, according to the
dissenters, overruled several precedents immunizing federal employees from
state taxation.131 In their disagreement with this approach, these conservative
anti-New Deal justices accepted-in fact, proclaimed-that the Home
Owners' Loan Corporation was an "instrumentality of the United States"
thereby assuming its constitutionality.
131
Although a majority of the Supreme Court allowed state taxation on
employees of the HOLC, the Corporation itself was insulated from paying
state transfer taxes on the recording of its mortgages in Pittman v. Home
Owners' Loan Corporation of Washington.'" The court took the opportunity
again in this unanimous decision to "assume... that the creation of the
Home Owners' Loan Corporation was a constitutional exercise of the
congressional power," relying on Graves.'
4
132 Id. at 486.
133 Id. at 475-77.
134 Id. at 477.
135 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
136 Graves v. NewYork ex rel. O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466, 492 (1939) (Butler, & McReynolds, JJ.,
dissenting).
137 Id. at 480, 486 (majority opinion).
13 Id. at 492 (Butler, & McReynolds, JJ., dissenting). The Justices relied on several cases,
including New York ex rel. Rogers v. Graves, 299 U.S. 401 (1937), and Brush v. Commissioner, 300 U.S. 352
(1937), both from the previous term, and Dobbins v. Commissioners of Erie County, 41 U.S. 435 (1842). Id.
t39 Id.
140 308 U.S. 21 (1939).
141 Id. at 32. Justice Butler took no part in the decision. Id. at 33.
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While one challenge to the constitutionality of certain aspects of the
Home Owners' Loan Act would be successful, 42 the Corporation as a whole
was held to be a constitutional entity by both liberal and conservativejustices
alike. So, although the Supreme Court did not ignore the constitutional
issues regarding the HOLC, invariably its existence was protected and its
constitutionality assumed. In light of the greater struggle over the New
Deal, the seeming indifference of the Supreme Court is remarkable.
However, considering the HOLC was criticized-with more than some
truth-as corporate welfare, Supreme Court compassion for the agency is
not surprising. In fact, the economic philosophy inherent in the Home
Owners' Loan Corporation, bailing out lenders with massive capital which
would in turn help borrowers, fits squarely within the pro-business
Supreme Court philosophy made famous in Lochner v. New York. 3 Indeed,
the four horsemen may have found, in the pro-business Home Owners'
Loan Act, legislation that even they supported.
The lending record of the Home Owners' Loan Corporation exhibits its
pervasiveness in 1930s American society. The Corporation received
1,886,491 applications for home mortgage refinances betweenJune 13,1933,
and June 27, 1935, which was the last day for applications. 144 Over 50
percent of these loans were closed by the HOLC with a total outlay of
mortgage money exceeding $3 billion. 14 To place the impact of the HOLC
in perspective, of the "nonfarm owner-occupied dwellings in the country"
that were mortgaged at the outset of 1933, "the Corporation made loans on
more than one out of every five."" Thus, 20 percent of all eligible homes
142 On one occasion, the Supreme Court found one section of the Home Owners' Loan Act
unconstitutional-or at least interpreted the act so as to avoid constitutional conflict. Hopkins Fed. Say.
& Loan Assoc. v. Cleary, 269 U.S. 315 (1935). In that case, the banking commission of Wisconsin
brought suit against the Hopkins Street Building and Loan, attempting to annul the conversion of that
entity into a federal savings and loan. Id. at 327-28. Conversion was authorized by the Home Owners'
Loan Act, 48 Stat. 128, 132 (1933). Id. at 330-331. The petitioners argued that this "transmutation" did
not require state authorization. Id. at 330. The state argued it was implied in the Act that "no conversion
was to be permitted in contravention of local laws" otherwise, that section of the act was "void under the
Tenth Amendment as an unconstitutional trespass upon the powers of the state." Id. at 332. In an
opinion drafted by Justice Cardozo, the Court sided with the state, citing the Tenth Amendment
argument. Id. at 327, 335, 343.
143 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
144 HARRiss, supra note 30, at 21-22 tbl.2.
145 Id. at 29. The most common reason for rejecting applications was "inadequate security"
meaning the home did not appraise at a high enough value to justify the loan. Id. at 24 tbl.3. An
additional 90,000 applications were withdrawn by the homeowner, probably as a result of a restructuring
of the debt by the borrower and lender. Id.
146 Id. at 31. The average loan amount was $3,093.00. Id. at 30 tbl.4. The Corporation reached
its peak lending month in June, 1934 when it closed 82,000 loans. Id. As far as disbursement of HOLC
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in the United States were mortgaged to the Home Owners' Loan Corpora-
tion.
The Home Owners' Loan Corporation impacted 1930s society and the
future of the American mortgage in significant ways. From the perspective
of the day, the contributions of the HOLC were very real. The statistic of
one in five eligible homes in America that received a HOLC mortgage
represented one million families that did not suffer the economic tragedy,
public humiliation and emotional turmoil of forcible eviction from a
home.147 The magnitude to which the lives of these one million families
were touched by this organization cannot be discounted. One million
families were not afraid to receive their mail each day for fear of the eviction
notice; one million families did not suffer the humiliation of carrying
furniture and belongings out of their homes as neighbors watched; one
million families were not forced to move to a different neighborhood, into
cramped houses with relatives and to transfer children to new schools; one
million families did not have their credit destroyed and a sense of utter
failure and the corresponding depression, addictions and petty crimes that
often followed.
From the perspective of history, the Home Owners' Loan Corporation
is one of the great success stories of the New Deal. Although historically
inconspicuous148 and overshadowed by more prominent New Deal agencies
and the federal mortgage organizations that followed, the HOLC holds an
important place in American mortgage history. As historian Kenneth T.
mortgage money throughout the United States, the state of Ohio saw the most loans made, while New
York received the most money in terms of dollars. Id. at 32 tbl.5. The HOLC made loans in all of the
48 states, the District of Columbia, and the territories of Alaska, Hawaii and Puerto Rico. Id. at 32-33
tbl.5.
147 Id. at 29. Obviously, some of the mortgages issued by the HOLC were foreclosed. Upon
liquidation in 1951, 19.1 percent of the HOLC-issued mortgages were foreclosed, representing 194,134
properties. Id. at 75. (Table 19). Regardless, nearly 81 percent of formerly distressed mortgages were
successfully saved, and countless others were renegotiated by the original lenders in response to the
HOLC. Id.
148 The HOLC is not quite as inconspicuous since the subprime mortgage market tumult. The
2008 financial crisis has politicians and financial observers climbing up to the New Deal attic, dusting
offand revisiting the Home Owners' Loan Corporation like at no other time in history. Senator Hillary
Clinton "proposed a new Home Owners' Loan Corporation" in an Op-Ed letter to the Wall Street
Journal entitled "Let's Keep People in Their Homes." Hillary Rodham Clinton, Let's Keep People in Their
Homes, WALL ST. J., Sep. 25, 2008, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122230767702474045.
html. "The original HOLC returned a profit to the Treasury and saved one million homes. We can save
roughly three times that many today." Id. HOLC nostalgia is bi-partisan; Senator John McCain
championed Senator Clinton's proposal during his presidential campaign. Jackie Calmes, Long History
for Proposal by McCain on Mortgages, N. Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 2008, available at http//www.nytimes.
con/2008/10/08/us/politics/08mortgage.html.
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Jackson has identified, the HOLC "introduced, perfected and proved in
practice the feasibility of the long-term self-amortizing mortgage with
uniform payments spread over the whole life of the debt."' 49 The HOLC
showed that amortization would prevent, or at least reduce the likelihood of
a future mortgage money crunch. Additionally, standardized appraisal
practices established by the HOLC would become the model for national
land appraisal standards throughout the United States.'50 Remarkably, the
Home Owners' Loan Corporation achieved all of this with little cost to the
federal budget. Upon congressionally-ordered liquidation in 1951 and a
final accounting, the HOLC ultimately turned a slight profit.'5'
The Home Owners' Loan Corporation achieved an even more
intangible transformation, although no less significant. This unassuming
Corporation showed the federal government that it could successfully take
over, manage, and even originate mortgages. Standardized procedures
unknown in 1933 arose out of necessity in the day-to-day housekeeping of
a federal mortgage company. Boilerplate form mortgages, assignments and
satisfactions were created.'52 Procedures were established for originating
loans, foreclosing loans and managing foreclosed properties. These practices
and policies developed in a trial and error sort of way typical of the New
Deal.153 These experiences opened minds to the potential of future federal
149 JACKSON, supra note 16, at 196.
1SO Id. at 197. David Kennedy likens the standardization of appraisal methods by the HOLC to
the SEC's standardization of accounting procedures in the securities industry. KENNEDY, supra note 1,
at 369.
151 HARRISS, supra note 30, at 6, 159-62 (estimating that the HOLC profited $14 million). Of
course, numerous factors impacted this estimate. Id. at 160-62. For example, the original $200 million
capital advance from the U.S. Treasury came at no cost to the Corporation. Id. at 160. Additionally, the
HOLC enjoyed many free services as a government agency, such as postage, and did not make Social
Security payments. Id. at 161-62. However, had Congress not pressured the HOLC to sell its loans to
private institutions, the Corporation would have enjoyed still greater profits.
152 Copies of the form documents used by the HOLC can be found in the land records of
counties across America. Forjust one example, look no further than the premises located at 1244 East
94th Street, Brooklyn, NewYork-the home of"Muriel A. Maas and Charles F. Maas, her husband."
On September 25, 1935, the Maas's mortgaged their home for the sum of $3,533.54 to the Home
Owners' Loan Corporation, with offices at the New Post Office Building in Washington, D.C. A copy
ofthis refreshingly succinct, four-page (19 paragraphs) mortgage, recorded on Oct. 4, 1935, can be found
in the Kings County Clerk's Office in reel 5961 page 1807. Ifyou are wondering what happened to this
mortgage (HOLC loan number 30A-43958), it was assigned to the Dime Savings Bank of Brooklyn on
Jan. 27, 1950. (The assignment was recorded in the Kings County Clerk's Office on Apr. 23, 1950, in
reel 5961 page 1815). The HOLC assigned this mortgage, and thousands of others to local banks at this
time, in anticipation of the corporation's liquidation in 1951. Fear not-this mortgage story has a happy
ending. Mr. and Mrs. Maas paid offtheir mortgage and received a satisfaction on Apr. 3, 1950. (The
satisfaction was recorded in the Kings County Clerk's Office on Apr. 23, 1950, in reel 5961 page 1844).
153 For more on these procedures, see HARRISS, supra note 30, at 14, 71, 101.
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mortgage enterprises in that golden age of government-sponsored economic
experimentation.
V. THE NATIONAL HOUSING ACT OF 1934
The May 15, 1934, issue of The New York Times published the "Text
of President Roosevelt's Bill for Building and Repair of Homes to Aid
Recovery."5 4 By now, readers of the Times were familiar with the weekly
output of New Deal legislation passed to quell the tide of the Depression,
unemployment, and impending financial ruin. This new law was no
ordinary stopgap solution to relieve the crisis. It seems unlikely that
commuters on the New York City subway or Washington's senators and
congressmen all reading their morning papers understood that this piece of
legislation would revolutionize the way in which their children and
grandchildren would buy homes for the next seventy years. This new bill,
"The National Housing Act," 55 was the birth certificate for the Federal
Housing Administration (FHA) and the blueprint for a national mortgage
market. The Federal Housing Administration-along with other New Deal
institutions such as Social Security, the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation and the Securities and Exchange Commission-would become
so entrenched in American society that it is inconceivable to imagine an
America without it.
Historian Kenneth T. Jackson identified the task assigned to the
draftsmen of the National Housing Act by FDR was to create legislation that
would "stimulate building without government spending and that would
rely instead on private enterprise." 56 Home ownership was of great
importance to President Roosevelt." 7 Thus, FDR assigned top members
of his Brain Trust to achieve the task.5 8 Their goals were laid out in the
preamble to the National Housing Act: "to improve conditions with respect
to home financing ... and to eliminate the necessity for costly second
154 Text of President Roosevelt's Bill or Building and Repair of Homes to Aid Recovery, NY. TIMES, May
15, 1934, at 36.
ss National Housing Act Hearings of 1934, supra note 28.
IS6 JACKSON, supra note 16, at 203.
157 Historian Jordan A. Schwarz has written: "Roosevelt had a passionate interest in
homeownership, viewing it as a 'right' for the individual American and 'a guarantee of social and
economic stability' for the nation." SCHWARZ, supra note 1, at 86.
158 JACKSON, supra note 16, at 203 (identifying the draftsman of the National Housing Act as
Winfield Riefler, Miles Lanier Colean, Francis Perkins, Marriner Eccles, Averell Harriman, and Henry
Wallace). Much time was spent analyzing potential solutions to the housing problems: "The President's
Emergency Commission on Housing spent much of 1933 and early 1934 studying the problem."
OLSON, supra note 1, at 96.
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mortgage financing." ' 9 How would these New Dealers create a national
mortgage market with little cost to the government? Building on their
experience with the Home Owners' Loan Corporation, the National
Housing Act draftsmen constructed their plan around five intertwined
concepts. 160
Entered into the record at the outset of the National Housing Act
hearings before the Senate Banking and Currency committee was a study of
the American "debt problem" titled "The Internal Debts of the United
States. " 161 Accompanying the pamphlet was a letter from John H. Fahey,
chairman of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board and former head of the
HOLC, which predicated a "return to prosperity" on solving "the urban
mortgage problem." 62 The pamphlet summarized the five central concepts
behind the National Housing Act.' 63
The first step toward recovery in the national mortgage market was to
bring immediate relief to unemployment in "the building trades.' 64 To that
end, the pamphlet proposed "a Nationwide program of home moderniza-
tion" consisting of an advertising campaign to encourage home improve-
ments and a government corporation to insure loans made from private
banks so homeowners could pay to finance home improvement projects.
65
These projects would increase the value of homes and create jobs for the
multitudes of unemployed carpenters, plumbers, electricians, cement
workers, plasterers, latherers, painters, and roofers,just to name a few of the
trades sitting on the sidelines awaiting employment. The pamphlet
recognized the home improvement encouragement proposal was only a
159 National Housing Act Hearings of 1934, supra note 28.




164 Id. Several witnesses, particularly those involved with drafting the legislation, highlighted
unemployment as the key problem causing the Depression and that the new legislation hoped to
ameliorate it. Marriner S. Eccles began his testimony concerned with "the unemployment problem" and
opined: "Practically every other problem goes back to that problem." Id. at 153. Secretary of Labor,
Frances Perkins, testified on behalfof the Department ofLabor "merely to canvass the need for this bill."
Id. at 166. She stressed that unemployment relief, "one of the most essential features of the recovery
program," was the goal of this new legislation. Id. at 166. Harry L. Hopkins, the Federal Emergency
Relief Administrator focused on the unemployment problem as well. Id. at 177-80. "Somewhere
between one third and one fourth of all the families on relief represent workers in the building trades.
We are not going to get these people to work unless we can get some of the private money out." Id. at
177. Hopkins recognized "[tlhe modernization program itself... will immediately put a great many
people to work." Id. at 178.
165 Id. at 14.
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temporary "stimulant" to the unemployment problem."6 Re-employment
was an attractive justification for legislation and a favorite of congressmen
since it was simple to understand and explain to voters. Perhaps the Housing
Act draftsmen used it as an enticement to pass the bill which contained their
ultimate plan-revolutionizing the home mortgage industry.
The second step in the plan was to encourage the creation of "a sound
[mortgage] instrument" with amortization, or "periodic" payments of the
entire mortgage balance over a long period of time. 67 Borrowers could
thereby gradually pay off the loan from their monthly salaries without
confronting a balloon payment every few years, and an ensuing scramble to
refinance the expiring mortgage."6 Steady, equal payments similar to rent
reduced the likelihood of mortgage foreclosures because homeowners would
grow accustomed to the mortgage payment as one of their usual household
expenses. Creating a fixed monthly mortgage payment as a part of a home-
owner's budget would enhance the certainty lenders felt that full satisfaction
of the mortgage debt would follow. Thus, lenders could risk issuing larger
mortgages on higher percentages of the value of homes and thereby lend to
an increasing number of Americans who had less money for their down
payment. The confidence banks felt in the return on their loans would
bring more banks into the field of mortgage lending.169
The third step was to increase the security lenders felt in the soundness
of their mortgage investments. Thus, the National Housing Act created a
federal agency, called the Home Credit Insurance Corporation 170 to "insure
amortized mortgages.., on owner occupied homes.., when presented by
approved financial institutions.,17' This corporation would insure mortgages
that met certain requirements, such as amortization, maximum interest rates,
and a minimum amount of money down toward the overall value of the
premises.172 The insurance would guarantee a return on lenders' invest-
ments in the event of foreclosure. 73 In theory, the corporation would pay
for this insurance through premiums charged to the borrowers; thus, it
166 Id. at 16.
167 Id. at 17.
168 Id.
169 For more on improving mortgage terms, seegenerally Peter M. Carrozzo, Marketing heAmerican
Mortgage: The Emergency Home Finance Act of 1970, Standardization and the Secondary Market Revolution, 39
REAL PROP. PROB. & TR.J. 765 (2005).
170 National Housing Act Hearings of 1934, supra note 28, at 1.




would be of minimal cost to taxpayers. 74 A fourth step in this plan, and a
clear corollary of the third step was to continue the work already begun by
the HOLC appraisers to establish a national system of real estate appraisal.17
The concept of definite appraisal standards, along with federal insurance
against financial loss in the event of foreclosure, would increase the security
and certainty lenders felt in their investments and bring more lenders into
the field.'76
The fifth and final step in overhauling the American mortgage industry
was "to introduce the element of liquidity."' The National Housing Act
allowed for the creation of "national mortgage associations" which were
private mortgage lending institutions that would engage in "purchasing,
selling[,] and otherwise dealing in credit instruments secured by such
mortgages. "178 Sound mortgage instruments would be "safe and acceptable
investments for mortgage associations . . . [who would] purchase such
insured mortgages from local institutions at a favorable price and thus
release fresh funds for local investment."
179
This last step is, perhaps, the most revolutionary proposal in the
legislation. These mortgage associations were the first national institutions
to engage in the business of buying and selling mortgages as traded com-
modities. The concept of a mortgage market embodied in these national
mortgage associations ultimately would liberate and reinvent mortgages as
new investment vehicles; a deluge of new money would flood the mortgage
industry and democratize home ownership, making it accessible to an
unprecedented number of Americans.' 8° Safe investment opportunities
would be created for upper- and middle-class Americans whose savings
would be invested in packaged mortgages.181 This commoditization of the
American mortgage and the corresponding democratization of home
ownership, ushered in by the National Housing Act, are still felt today in
our nation of homeowners and inexpensive mortgages allowing Americans
to live in and on their greatest asset.
174 Id. "Such insurance... [would] be self-supporting and involve no greater cost to mortgagors
or mortgagees than that needed to cover the risk involved plus necessary administration expenses." Id.
at 2-3.
175 Id. at 16.
176 Id. at 16-17.
177 Id. at 19.
178 Id.
179 Id.
180 Seegenerally Carrozzo, supra note 169, at 799-805. The balance of the twentieth century, and
beyond, saw this movement towards commoditizing mortgages. Id.
181 Id.
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This five-step plan would create "a sound mortgage market."' 2 The
enormity of the mortgage problem was recognized: "Mortgage debts
comprise one of the largest single classifications in our national-debt
structure."' 3 The Home Owners' Loan Corporation, intended merely to
handle "extreme emergency cases" could not be looked to as a permanent
solution unless the federal government intended "to take the radical step of
assuming the entire mortgage-debt burden."" 4 This ambitious five-step plan
of the National Housing Act was nothing short of a complete overhaul of
the flawed mortgage system in existence at the outset of the Depression.
The genius of FDR's mortgage policies was in his appreciation of the
need for federal spending that would assist big business. Similar to the
HOLC, the NHA brought relief to lenders. In fact, every phase in the plan
brought direct assistance for the lending institutions, with indirect benefits
to borrowers. The mortgage insurance system and national appraisal
standards would reduce the risk assumed by banks in lending money. A
market for mortgages would increase lenders' liquidity. By directly assisting
banks by reducing the cost of doing business, the National Housing Act
would indirectly help borrowers by reducing the cost and increasing the
availability of mortgage money. 18' This New Deal for America's banks is an
unappreciated and inconspicuous aspect of President Roosevelt's legacy." 6
The various steps worked best together, since they were mutually
dependent in several ways. The plan to purchase mortgages forced the
market to bring about improved mortgage instruments because only long-
term amortized mortgages of no more than 80 percent of the value of the
home would be purchased.'87 The creation of the mortgage associations
finished an interdependent assembly line process of mortgage lending;
182 National Housing Act Hearings of 1934, supra note 28, at 16.
183 Id. A table cited in the pamphlet listed the current American home mortgage debt at $21
billion, just $5 billion short of the entire federal debt. Id.
184 Id. Horace Russell of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board agreed: 'Unless these results are
accomplished the pressure for an indefinite extension of the Home Owners' Loan Corporation to absorb
the whole home-mortgage field... will be almost irresistible." Id. at 71.
185 Stewart McDonald, the first administrator of the Federal Housing Authority, explained the
benefit to home buyers quite well in hearings before the House Committee on Banking and Currency
in 1937: "1 would say the greatest beneficiary [of the FHA] is the individual home buyer, whether he
is buying a new home or one that has already been built. He is able to buy it on terms that are less harsh
than ever before in the history of this country." Extension of Debentures Issued by Federal Housing
Administration: Hearings on H.R.J. Res. 127 Before the H. Committee on Banking and Currency, 75th Cong. 6
(1937) [hereinafter National Housing Act Hearings of 1937].
186 For an excellent work that focuses on the manner in which the New Deal aided private
businesses, including the banking industry, through such under-appreciated agencies as the
Reconstruction Finance Corporation, see generally OLSON, supra note 1.
197 National Housing At Hearings of 1934, supra note 28.
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available mortgage money would be used to originate sound mortgages that
would be insured and then sold to mortgage associations to create new
mortgage money, thus continuing the mortgage lending cycle in perpetu-
ity."s  This five-part plan created the "market for insured mortgages." s9
The real benefits of this market would be felt when spread across the entire
nation. The "Internal Debts" pamphlet describes "the inadequacy of local
savings for mortgage financing in growing communities," and the potential
ofa national market to funnel investment money from "settled communities
S.. where there is less economic demand ... [and] consequently a large
available supply of mortgage funds.""9°
The prescience of the "Internal Debts" pamphlet,9 ' which laid out this
plan, and the similarities between it and the proposed National Housing Act
leads one to conclude that the authors of the pamphlet were either the same
individuals who drafted the NHA, or at least very familiar with the
draftsmen. The testimony that followed during the next week of NHA
hearings would expand upon the simple yet revolutionary central themes of
the pamphlet and the proposed housing bill: assisting employment through
home improvement loans, creating a sound mortgage instrument, enhancing
lender confidence through insurance for mortgages and a national appraisal
system, and increasing liquidity by creating a market for these sound, safe,
and (thus) tradable mortgages.
Testimony from several of the act's draftsmen expanded upon the five-
step plan behind the National Housing Act. Frank C. Walker, the Executive
Director of President Roosevelt's National Emergency Council was the first
to testify.192 The National Emergency Council was directed to draft
legislation that would "coordinate" the government's attempts to remedy the
"frozen condition" in the "mortgage market." 93 Mr. Walker said the focus
was "to stimulate private capital ... [with] as little cost to the Government
as possible." 94
188 Id. at 19-20.
189 Id. at 19.
190 Id. at 20.
191 Id. at 14.
192 Id. at 21. The National Emergency Council was created by President Roosevelt through
Executive Order 6433-A, November 17, 1933. John T. Woolley and Gerhard Peters, The American
Presidency Project [online]. Santa Barbara, CA: University of California (hosted), Gerhard Peters
(database). Available from World Wide Web: httpI/www.presidency.ucsb.edu/wsnpid = 14557.
193 National Housing Act Hearings of 1934, supra note 28, at 21.
194 Id. at 22.
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Winfield W. Riefler, economic advisor to FDR's Executive Council' 95
and a draftsman of the National Housing Act, testified with intimate
knowledge on the practical workings of the new law, focusing on the second
phase of the plan, the creation of a sound mortgage document. 96 Mr.
Riefler was a member of the Federal Reserve Board of Governors since
1923, on temporary loan to the Executive Council, who therefore under-
stood the flaws in American mortgage lending."9 After identifying the
problems with the mortgage document as it existed at the outset of the
Depression, Mr. Riefler explained the goals for the new legislation: "the
introduction of a mortgage instrument which will be the soundest thing in
the market... [and] to create a market for that kind of mortgage."' 98
Mr. Riefler's description of a "model home mortgage instrument"
involved several factors. Lenders originating these new mortgages must be
"satisfactory to the board that is running this."' 99 Mortgages must be
amortized "not more than [twenty] years" on "owner-occupied" dwellings
held by borrowers "who [are] of good financial standing in relation to the
loan" and with limits on the interest rate "not more than 5 [percent]."2°°
These types of mortgages would qualify for the government insurance which
Mr. Riefler went on to describe. 20' The "insurance feature" would be of no
cost to the government.2 Instead, it would be paid for by the borrower to
the lender, who would then "transmit on to the insurance corporation a
charge of usually 1 percent on the original outstandingvalue of the mortgage
195 The Executive Council was a temporary body created by FDR under Executive Order 6202-a
onJuly 11,1933. John T. Woolley and Gerhard Peters, The American Presidency Project [online]. Santa
Barbara, CA: University of California (hosted), Gerhard Peters (database). Available from World Wide
Web: http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid= 14478. It may seem redundant to have an Executive
Council and National Emergency Council with similar powers. However, President Roosevelt typically
presided over a Byzantine system of agencies with overlapping powers. It is surprising the word "multi-
tasking" did not arise in the 1930s to describe FDR's style of governing. Eventually, the redundancy was
resolved by Executive Order 6889-Awhich consolidated the National Emergency Council and Executive
Council, basically terminating the latter and moving both its members and duties under the umbrella
of the former. John T. Woolley and Gerhard Peters, The American Presidency Project [online]. Santa
Barbara, CA: University of California (hosted), Gerhard Peters (database). Available from World Wide
Web: http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid= 14769. For more on FDR's governing style, seegenerally
KENNEDY, supra note 1.
19 JACKSON, supra note 16, at 203.
197 National Housing Act Hearings of 1934, supra note 28, at 49.
198 Id. at 50.
'9 Id. at 52.
2W o Id. at 52-53.
201 Id. at 53.
2M Id. at 52.
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each year." 23 After payment of the premium, the government corporation
"underwrites the whole transaction" until the mortgage is paid off, at which
time the borrower gets a "dividend back" of the excess money paid toward
the insurance. 2°4 In the event of default, the lender could either foreclose or
turn the property over to the government corporation in exchange for a
"debenture, guaranteed by the Treasury," representing payment of the
principal and "not more than 3 [percent] interest, and due [three] years after
the mortgage would have matured."2 5
By paying banks reduced interest on their failed mortgage investments,
lenders would not be encouraged to make a profit turning over "bad loans"
to the government corporation.2 Lenders would be made whole by the
corporation but not stand to profit; otherwise, the system would act as an
inducement to "foreclose immediately on any technical delinquency. "2'7
The new corporation would act only as an "insurance fund" so that a new
depression would not create a new mortgage money crash and force lenders
out of business by the thousands.08
Ultimately, Mr. Riefler explained these improvements would create a
"mortgage instrument... so promising that it will attract the lowest rate in
the market" and therefore reduce the cost, by way of interest rates, to the
borrower.2°9 Mr. Riefler, focusing on the fifth step of the plan--enhancing
liquidity-explained how to maximize the full potential of these safe,
standardized, and insured mortgage instruments, and truly create an
unprecedented national mortgage market. Mr. Riefler and the other minds
behind the NHA anticipated that the proposed "National Mortgage
Associations... [would] be able to raise funds in the market, where funds
are cheapest, selling their securities in the New York Security Market...
provided those funds are loaned on insured mortgages." 21' Only a sound
mortgage could qualify for the insurance; once insured these associations
could "collateral their bonds or debentures with insured mortgages approved
W3 Id.
2 Id. at 52-53.
2 Id. at 53.
26 Id.
207 Id. at 54.
2 Id.
2D9 Id. at 56.
210 Id. at 62. This concept of mortgage money moving from regions with a savings surplus to
regions where savings and mortgage money were scarce and, thus, interest rates were high, was prevalent
throughout the hearings. Id. Horace Russell, General Counsel of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board,
testified: "This plan also contemplates that these [national mortgage] associations will get money from
where it is in the financial centers and lend it where it is needed in other sections of the country." Id. at
67.
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under this plan."211  Thus, a sound mortgage instrument was the pre-
requisite for the entire national mortgage market. Ultimately, Mr. Riefler
and his advisors were promoting a true commoditized mortgage and the
financial liberation of the national mortgage market.
Although Mr. Riefler's enthusiasm for the revolutionary nature of the
national mortgage associations comes through when reading the hearings,
it seems the senators missed its potential entirely. His explanation as to how
money would be moved on a national level is not met with any response.
The witness explained that the current problem is the dependence of interest
rates on "whether there is a plethora or a deficiency in local mortgage
funds."22 The new market would move funds from the East, where there
is less growth "and [an] excess, usually, of funds available for saving[s]" to
growing markets in the South and West where rates are high because of "a
large proportionate demand for mortgage money, and the local supply of
savings is not sufficient to take care of it."213 Unfortunately, just as Mr.
Riefler reached a crescendo in his predictions for the financial potential
unleashed by the future mortgage market, Senator Duncan Fletcher, the
chairman of the hearings, broke for recess.214 One can onlywonder whether
the assembled senators were focusing on the potential of the national
mortgage market or on that day's lunch menu.
Most of the witnesses that followed expanded on themes identified by
Mr. Riefler and the "Internal Debts" pamphlet.215 Marriner Eccles, Assistant
Secretary of the Treasury, and a draftsman of the legislation, had real-life
experience in banking;216 he was a banker in Utah who remembered many
sleepless nights in 1929 trying to keep his institution open.27 The idea
behind the legislation was "to induce ... lending institutions to take up this
credit expansion. . . ,to get people to borrow."218 For banks to function-in
fact, to survive-they needed to make loans, which "is the only way they
[banks] can conduct profitable operations"
219
211 Id. at 62.
212 Id.
213 Id. at 62-63.
214 Id. at 63.
215 Id. at 14.
216 According to historian James S. Olson, Marriner Eccles "wrote" the National Housing Act.
OLSON, supra note 1, at 96.
217 Mr. Eccles "managed to keep his institution open through an agonizing day of massive
withdrawals by depositors only by instructing his tellers to work in slow-motion, deliberately counting
out sums in small denomination bills." KENNEDY, supra note 1, at 68.
218 National Housing Act Hearings of 1934, supra note 28, at 155.
219 Id.
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The first step in the strategy, the home improvement mortgage plan,
received the attention of several witnesses. Secretary Eccles saw it as an
integral part of the NIA targeting an immediate influx of money into the
market. 220 The government's role in the national mortgage market would
be "to induce lending" through a national education campaign for borrowers
regarding the National HousingAct and to increase lenders' comfort in their
investment through mortgage insurance.22' Harry L. Hopkins, Federal
Emergency Relief Administrator, saw the National Housing Act as "the
beginning [of] a great housing program in America... which will extend for
many, many years."222 The "modernization [plan]" would be the first step
in stimulating the market. 223 Chairman Fahey of the Federal Home Loan
Bank Board identified the origins of the mortgages for home improvements
plan. 4 Overseeing the workings of the HOLC, Chairman Fahey saw first-
hand the vast number of mortgage applications rejected by the Corpora-
tion.22' Many of these loans were for home improvements. The limited
resources of the HOLC were earmarked for saving distressed mortgages and
could not be diverted for home improvements. 26 A clear opportunity for
lending was lost.
The testimony of bankers and entrepreneurs provided the most
fascinating commentaries on the potential of the new legislation. Charles A.
Miller, formerly president of the Savings Bank Trust Company in New
York City, and a banker since 1890, was manager of the New York
Reconstruction Finance Corporation.227 To Mr. Miller, the key to the new
mortgage market was amortization-something he had experience with
since the Panic of 189 2 .m In a colorful anecdote emblematic of the potential
of amortized loans, Mr. Miller told of a farmer who offered "to buy [me]
the best dinner there is to be had in the city of Utica" because the amortized
loan he made through Mr. Miller's bank allowed him to eventually own his
farm outright-a feat that had evaded this grateful farmer's father. 229 This
was Mr. Miller's experience with many customers; amortization gave
American borrowers the hope that "in the future ... although it may be very
220 See id. at 162.
221 Id.
m Id. at 178.
2 Id.
224 Id. at 193.
n Id. at 196.
U6 Id.
2V Id. at 301.
22 Id. at 303.
V Id.
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slow work, we are going to pay our debts.""0 Mr. Miller believed the
myopic greed of lenders interested in the quick money that could be made
in refinancing fees prevented amortization to take hold sooner.231
Orrin C. Lester, Vice President of the Bowery Savings Bank in New
York City, saw in the National Housing Act "the foundation.., for building
the kind of complete mortgage machinery that we need for the future."232
He also predicted amortization would be the wave of the future.233 Nearly
all of the bank officers who testified were unanimous in their support of
amortization and their enthusiasm for the future of mortgage lending as a
result of the NHA.234 As would be expected, several critics of the National
Housing Act testified as well. Benjamin C. March, Executive Secretary of
the People's Lobby, a left-of-center organization, testified in strong
opposition to the legislation: "It is nonsense to think that you can resuscitate
the building industry by guaranteeing bonds or mortgages."235 Having
studied municipal housing in Europe, he believed the housing problem in
America could only be solved if the government took over the building
trades and provided the housing directly.
2 36
I. Friedlander, the president of a savings and building association in
Houston and Vice President of the United States Building and Loan League,
criticized the threat of government subsidized competition from the new
Corporation to the building and loan industry.237 However, he testified in
favor of Title III of the National Housing Act which created the Federal
Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation, which would guarantee deposits
in savings and loans, just as the FDIC guaranteed deposits in national
banks.23 The savings and loan industry was specifically geared toward
lending money from savings. So, Mr. Friedlander argued, by increasing the
confidence of people in the security of their deposits, money would flow
2V Id.
23 Id.
232 Id. at 312.
233 "[Tihe tendency is going to be in the future to insist that there shall be a consistent program
and plan to amortize all kinds of real-estate mortgages." Id. at 316.
"4 Witnesses who held positive views of the National Housing Act included Harold Stone,
President of the Onondaga County Savings Bank, in Syracuse, New York: "I like this bill primarily
because it uses private money in the first instance and that it does not involve the forming of such a large
organization as your Home Owners' Loan Corporation necessarily has to be and necessarily takes a long
time to get in operation." Id. at 342-43. Also, Roger Steffan, Vice President of the National City Bank
in New York City felt strongly about the amortization requirements. Id. at 346.
235 Id. at 144.
2M Id. at 146.
237 Id. at 227-28. The United States Building and Loan League was organized in 1892 for the
purpose of regulating the Building and Loan industry. Id.
238 Id. at 236.
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into the savings and loan industry the way it had for 103 years: "on a
cooperative basis, accumulating funds into a common fund of savers and
investors for the purpose of lending on homes."239 The witness felt this was
a practical, proven system that should have been bolstered. The HOLC had
helped get the building and loan industry back on its feet.2' The witness felt
the issuance of debentures in exchange for foreclosed mortgages made by
commercial banks would not provide sufficient liquidity to attract investors
and would injure the progress made by building and loans under the
HOLC.241
Likewise, Morton Bodfish, also from the United States Building and
Loan League, testified against the formation of the NHA.242 Instead, he
proposed the HOLC be further capitalized, allowing it to underwrite the
entire building and loan industry.243 This would allow immediate re-
employment because "thousands of existing going institutions, with all the
machinery [in place] ... can make the loans."2 "1 Mr. Bodfish ominously
painted the national mortgage associations as predators "roam[ing] up and
down the land." 245 Finally, he predicted the National Housing Act was "the
fundamental beginning of the nationalization or socialization of the whole
urban mortgage business."
246
On June 28, 1934, President Roosevelt signed the National Housing
Act.247 FDR discussed the new piece of housing legislation ("an act which
I signed today") in a fireside chat that evening reviewing the achievements
of the Seventy-Third Congress. He identified the new legislation as a
"definite step[] toward a national housing program."248 The President
summarized the NIA simply as an act "designed to encourage private
capital in the rebuilding of the homes of the Nation."249 Perhaps families
gathered around their RCA radios did not understand the workings or
potential of the new legislation. But, the reassuring, aristocratic voice of
239 Id. at 227.
240 Id. at 235.
241 Id. at 236-38.
242 Id. at 244.
243 Id. at 251.
244 Id.
245 Id. at 258.
246 Id. at 271. Of course, this distaste for socializing the mortgage industry did not sway Mr.
Bodfish from encouraging the HOLC to underwrite the building and loan industry.
247 The American Presidency Project, Franklin D. Roosevelt, Fireside Chat (June 28, 1934)
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid= 14703 [hereinafter Fireside Chat]. See National Housing Act,
12 U.S.C. S 1701 (1934).
248 Fireside Chat, supra note 247.
249 Id.
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FDR comforted a nation of hopeful renters and families living with relatives
that help, in the form of something called the National Housing Act, was on
the way.
The NewYork Times reported the enactment of "the housing measure
... designed to encourage the expenditure of [$3,000,000,000] [three billion
dollars] on the construction or renovation ofhomes." ° Not coincidentally,
the act was passed the same day national lumber dealers announced a 10
percent reduction in the cost of lumber and building materials.25' In sum,
"[t]he Housing Act" as reported in the Times, "makes possible loans of
[$1,000,000,000] [one billion dollars] by banks, building and loan
associations, and other lending agencies for repairs and renovations with a
guarantee of 20 percent by the government."2 2 An additional one billion
dollars of mortgage money would be insured on new home mortgages that
"do not exceed [$16,000] nor 80 percent of the value of the property."2 3
Prior to enactment, The NewYork Times, in conjunction with "officials
of the National Emergency Council," prepared a "catechism" listing four
hypothetical scenarios where people could take advantage of the new
legislation. 2"4 The scenarios explained how to borrow money under the
NHA for repairs and extensions to existing houses, or construction of new
homes, and are particularly helpful in understanding the practical workings
of the new legislation. 25  One example deals with a building loan for
construction of a new home costing $10,000 for a hypothetical borrower
named "George Brown."256 After construction is complete, George Brown
"goes to a building and loan association or a bank and puts a mortgage on his
house, paying it off as any other mortgage.., assisted by the long-term
possibilities."257 Addressing all of the options to borrower and lender alike,
the article concludes with the question, "what can the bank do with this
mortgage."" 8 Although prior to enactment of the NHA, the answer would
have been to wait for repayment, now, members of the Federal Home Loan





254 Housing Bill Gives 4 Home Loan Aids, N.Y. TIMES, June 20,1934, at 2.
255 Id.
2. Id. "Q.-George Brown wants to build a $10,000 house. What does he do? A.-He goes to





Bank System "can sell it to a National Mortgage Association... [which] can
buy up mortgages, permitting banks to make more loans." 59
One article addressing the new legislation labeled it as "the most
important mortgage legislation ever adopted by Congress. Z60 According to
Hugh Potter, president of the National Association of Real Estate Boards,
the new legislation "will reorganize the country's mortgage system along
lines of longer-term loans and lower interest rates" and had the potential "to
stabilize the flow of private capital into . . . the financing of home
ownership."26' An editorial to The New York Times a few days before the
passage of the NHA predicted the twenty-year amortized loan feature of the
act would make payments feel "almost like rent."2" Ultimately, all of the
authorities on the real estate market agreed: "[T]he government is clearly
endeavoring to change the mortgage structure into a new form not hitherto
in any general use in the United States."263
VI. THE FEDERAL HOUSING ADMINISTRATION
Much of the success of the National Housing Act-in fact, of the entire
New Deal-was dependent on an effective advertising campaign. President
Roosevelt's administration was the first to fully appreciate and take
advantage of mass communication at a time when technology made it
possible.26" James A. Moffett, the first director of the new Federal Housing
Administration, created by the National Housing Act, announced in August
his intention to begin a national campaign to assist lending.265 On August 5,
1934, only thirty-seven days after enactment of the National Housing Act,
an article written by FHA director Moffett appeared in The New York
Times promoting the FHA.2" Believing in the principle "that in the better
housing of America lies prosperity and recovery for the American people,"




26o Mortgage Stability Seen in Housing Act, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 1934, at 36.
261 Id.
2 Insured Mortgage Serves Vital Need, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 1934, at RE1.
23 Id.
264 See, e.g., LAWRENCEW. LEVINE & CORNELIA R. LEVINE, THE PEOPLE AND THE PRESIDENT:
AMERICA'S CONVERSATION WITH FDR (2002); GRAHAMJ. WHITE, FDRAND THE PRESS (1979); Betty
H. Winfield, The New Deal Publicity Operation: Foundation for the Modem Presidency, 61 JOURNALISM
QUARTERLY 40, 218 (1984).
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Primarily, the mortgage division of the FH6A2 8 would take longer to set
up, due to "its wide ramifications and necessity for the most careful pre-
liminary planning. 269 However, once the mortgage division was function-
ing, "it will enable private capital to make insured loans ... thus opening up
an enormous field of opportunities for investors to utilize profitability and
with the utmost of safety." 270 Mr. Moffett believed the current "blockade of
the mortgage-money market" was caused primarily by "the fear of loss and
the need for liquidity on the part of lenders."271 Without giving the working
particulars, he promised: "The Housing Act will break this blockade by
assuring safety in lending and providing liquidity."272 Prophetically, Mr.
Moffett believed the FHA would create "the rolling snowball" effect and,
ultimately, even those who designed the legislation and worked intimately
in the housing industry "hardly can visualize the unprecedented
potentialities for good that the Housing Act holds."
273
In January 1937, after the Federal Housing Administration had been up
and running for two years, the House held additional hearings to extend the
U.S. guarantee on the FHA debentures that had already been issued. 4
Stewart McDonald, the current administrator, began the hearings testifying
on the progress achieved by the FHA.275 The FHA had issued debentures
in the amount of $37,000 and insured mortgages in the total amount of
$614,000,000 as ofJanuary 1937.276 In two years, foreclosure occurred on
only twelve properties in the entire United States, representing the $37,000
in debentures issued .2 ' At that point, "approximately 40 [percent] of all
new construction in the last [six] months in residential properties... has
been through the Federal Housing Administration." 278 Some builders and
developers were obtaining FHA approval of their projects prior to breaking
268 Mr. Moffett, in an attempt to simplify the makeup of the FHA, broke it down into two






Z74 National Housing Act Hearings of 1937, supra note 185.
Z75 Id. at 1.
276 Id. at 7.
2n Id. at 2. At one point, Administrator McDonald stated the amount was $36,000, if anyone is
concerned. Id. Of course, a one thousand dollar mistake in 1937 is much bigger than a one thousand
dollar mistake today.
Z78 Id. at 2. Mortgages on new construction made up 54 percent of the FHA's business. Id.
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ground, to assure FHA loans. This allowed FHA to act as a "policeman on
jerry-built houses.
"279
Abner Ferguson, chief counsel to FHA, explained how the FHA
accomplished this impressive record.? Once mortgages were insured, if the
lender foreclosed due to failure to make payments, the property would be
transferred to FFIA in exchange for debentures (bearing interest at 3 percent)
which matured three years after the mortgage would have matured."' FHA
would then have an opportunity to sell the property.28 If sale occurred
before the full term of the mortgage, the debentures would be redeemed.2 3
Although the FHA was under-capitalized, the guarantee from the U.S.
government gave lenders confidence. That guarantee was expiring in July
of 1937; the very purpose of these hearings was to extend the guarantee for
two more years. 284 Ultimately, this system gave lenders security in making
loans knowing that, based on the federal entities in place acting as a backstop
against mass foreclosure, lenders would not have to carry thousands of
foreclosed properties in case of a new crash. Additionally, transferring
foreclosed mortgages to the FHA for debentures exchanged real estate with
capital and enhanced liquidity-creating funds which could be used to issue
new mortgages.
Some congressmen were concerned with granting the two-year
extension, for fear the government would be involved in the market
indefinitely. Thus, the question was posed frequentlywhether the FHAwas
ready to "stand on its own bottom." 5 However, the representatives from
FHA did not want to tinker with a system that was working. Besides
creating "a kind of mortgage which was not then in existence," FHA pre-
empted the need, and cost, of a new HOLC in the event of a second crash. 6
What the congressmen failed to recognize in their hope that eventually the
FHA would not need federal government backing, was the concept of public
perception. Lenders and borrowers only felt secure in the FHA if the U.S.
279 Id. at 3. As Administrator McDonald stated, common sense dictated that builders get their
approval: "[A builder] would be automatically eliminating such a large proportion of the mortgage
money in the United States" if he didn't. Id. at 2.





M Id. at 18.
26 Id.
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government stood behind it.287 Removing that backing would compromise
public confidence and risk de-stabilizing the mortgage market.
Representative Edward L. O'Neil, from NewJersey, a home owner with
an FHA-insured mortgage and a former employee of the FHA, understood
the accomplishments of the two-year-old Administration-and defined the
essence of the New Deal for the American mortgage: "It has enabled the
average low-income earner to buy and own his home, with some assurance
that after a reasonable length of time the mortgage instrument against the
property will have been paid off and he will own the property free and
clear."2  Misunderstanding this achievement, Representative Jesse P.
Wolcott questioned how "the insurance of your mortgage by the Federal
Government increased employment?" 28 9 Democratizing home ownership
through amortization, sound mortgages, government guarantees, secure
investments to lenders and enhanced liquidity would not translate come
election day as well as the simple concept of creating jobs.
VII. FANNIE MAE AND THE BIRTH
OF THE NATIONAL MORTGAGE MARKET
At the end of 1937, additional hearings were held regarding certain
amendments to the FHA.2'9  A clearer picture of the success of the young
administration was presented. FHA Administrator Stewart McDonald
29 See KENNEDY, supra note 1, at 364-65. The essence of the entire New Deal, in Kennedy's
philosophy, was security: "achieving security was the leitmotif of virtually everything the New Deal
attempted." This security was to be for all Americans: "security for capitalists and consumers ... and
homeowners and bankers and builders as well." Instilling in people the belief that there would not be
a second depression was the key to recovery. To accomplish that, America needed to rehabilitate its
financial institutions (banks through FDIC, the stock market through SEC and the housing market
through FHA) in order to re-establish America's trust in the soundness of capitalism. Id.
s National Housing Act Hearings of1937, supra note 185, at 21.
n9 Id. Sometimes, the Congressmen were openly hostile to the FHA. See, e.g., id. at 24.
Congressman Gifford accused FHA ofhaving"a big propaganda section" which had led to great publicity
in the media. Id. Of course, Mr. McDonald responded, identifying the work done by their "education
department" and explained the good treatment by the media stemmed from the increased advertising
money from those building and real estate industries benefited by the FHA. Id. A statement from Frank
Carnahan of the National Lumber Dealers Association was read into the record commending the FHA
for its minimal cost to the government and excellent work towards "rehabilitation" of the lumber
industry. Id. at 26-27.
To Amend the National Housing Act: Hearings on S. 3055 Before the S. Committee on Banking and
Currency, 75th Cong. (1937) [hereinafter Hearings to Amend the National Housing Act]. The amendments
included reducing the down-payment from 20 to 10 percent; basing the insurance premium on the
outstanding balance of the mortgage rather than the original principal; allowing the FHA to foreclose,
rather than the original lender so that FHA would take title at the earliest possible date. Id.
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testified on the lending history of FHA from January 1, 1935, to December
1, 1937.2 1 "In the [two] years that we have been doing business we have
accepted for insurance a little over a billion dollars" all on residential
mortgages representing 80 percent of the value of the property. 2
Remarkably, in two years FHA took possession of a mere fifty-one houses
throughout the United States, with outstanding debentures issued to lenders
in the amount of$164,000.m Administrator McDonald explained how the
Fl-A worked to the senators, who did not completely understand the
process: "The money is loaned by the individual lending institutions, and
they sometimes have delinquencies ... if they do not [collect], they must
foreclose." 29 Through this process, FHA took over the fifty-one properties
and, in return, issued the debentures to the foreclosing institutions.295 With
one billion dollars of FHA mortgage money insured and only fifty-one
properties foreclosed, the success of FHA was astounding.
Administrator McDonald explained the difference in philosophies
between the HOLC and the FHA. The former institution was created to
"relieve individuals in distress" either because the borrower or lending
institution was in financial trouble.296 "But the main object of the Federal
Housing Administration has been to assist people to purchase homes on a
more favorable basis and with lower interest rates and on easier terms than
ever before." 297 In order to continue this important work and entrench the
vast improvements in the American mortgage industry in perpetuity,
Administrator McDonald discussed an additional amendment sought by the
FHA that changed the workings of the expiring government guarantee.
"This plan calls for the date of the expiration to be eliminated and the two
billion dollars to be a revolving fund as the mortgages are paid off."298 Thus,
the government guarantee would be a permanent fixture of the FHA. This
would eliminate a problem Administrator McDonald and his staff
experienced in attempting to establish national mortgage associations to
purchase FHA-approved mortgages. Businessmen were wary of establishing
these associations with the termination of the government guarantee
imminent.299
291 Id. at 18.
Id.
zm Id. at 19.
2N4 Id.
n" Id.
2 Id. at 20.
2 Id. at 21.
2 Id. at 24.
2 Id.
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Great attention was paid during the course of the December 1937
hearings to the purchase of mortgages from originating lenders and sale of
these mortgages as packaged investment vehicles. Jesse H. Jones, chairman
of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC),3 ° testified on the RFC's
early steps in buying and selling FHA mortgages. To date, the RFC
purchased close to 11,000 FHA mortgages totaling $43 million.3 °1 Without
going into detail as to purchasers, Mr. Jones reported that less than 10
percent of these mortgages had been sold to investors or paid in full.
3 °2
Marriner Eccles, by now considered a national authority on American
mortgage lending, testified on the FHA and the potential of buying and
selling mortgages. From his perspective, the FHA's purpose "was to create
a reform of the mortgage market or modify the financing of homes. 3 3 This
goal could only be achieved "by having the Government sit in the
background" thereby improving the confidence of lenders and borrowers
alike.3 4
In the opinion of Mr. Eccles, "the most important feature" of the FHA
strategy "is the organization of mortgage associations." 35 Although the
concept of mortgage associations was in the National Housing Act, these
institutions never arose through private enterprise "because of investor fears
about the mortgage markets."30 6 The proposed amendment would create a
national mortgage association as an extension of the Reconstruction Finance
Corporation. 7 The mortgage association proposal allowed for "a market for
insured mortgages in those areas of the country where there may not be
surplus funds."308 Fresh money would be "siphoned" into communities
with a shortage of mortgage money when the mortgage association
purchased mortgages from local institutions.3°9 Thus, local lenders could
originate new mortgages with the new funds, which mortgages would then
be available for purchase by the mortgage association.
Charles Garrison Meyer, a builder and developer in Queens, NewYork,
agreed with Mr. Eccles on the potential of a national mortgage association.
310
300 For biographical information ofJesse H. Jones' great work at the PIC, see SCHWARZ, supra
note 1, at 59-95.
301 Hearings to Amend the National Housing Act, supra note 290, at 34.
302 Id.
303 Id. at 165.
V Id.
3o Id. at 188.
306 OLSON, supra note 1, at 195.
M7 SCHWARZ, supra note 1, at 87.
308 Hearings to Amend the National Housing Act, supra note 290, at 188.
309 Id.
310 Hearings to Amend the National Housing Act, supra note 290, at 198.
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Mr. Meyer proposed the association would take these FHA-insured
mortgages they purchased, package them in a "central pool," and "issue[]
debentures against them."311 In the opinion of Mr. Meyer, these desirable
debentures would be in rare company: "[Y]ou would have securities that
would be next in importance in their quality to the securities of the United
States Government."312 In this new era of massive government spending to
repair the economy, the windfall of this self-perpetuating lending would
come at little to no cost to the government: "I do not think this plan would
cost the Government a cent."
313
Administrator McDonald, following up on his earlier testimony, opined
that "unless the mortgage association is formed on a large scale ... you
cannot get the full stimulation which this enterprise deserves." 314 A national
mortgage association would restore the flow of private capital into the
American mortgage system. Thousands of insured mortgages would be
turned into safe debentures in which "trust funds," "insurance companies,"
and "the public in small amounts" would invest.315 Everyone agreed creating
a national mortgage association would be the next logical step in the process
of transforming the American mortgage market into an assembly-line system
supplying unprecedented capital to lenders throughout the nation. This
potential enormous supply of mortgage money would flood the market and
lead to an unprecedented multitude of affordable mortgages and a nation of
homeowners for generations.316
The proposed amendments to the National HousingAct were passed by
a large majority in the Senate and House and signed by the President on
February 5, 1938.' On February 10, 1938, the National Mortgage Associa-
311 Id.
312 Id.
313 Id. William Green, President of the American Federation of Labor, agreed with this
assessment of the great potential of a national mortgage association: "These national mortgage
associations will perform an important function as clearing houses for the purchase and sale of insured
mortgages, assuring the supply of capital funds to the localities where these funds are most needed." Id.
at 239-40. In The New York Times, Senator Wagner, chairman of the Senate Banking and Currency
Committee, called the new proposal to fund national mortgage association "the final link in the Federal
Government's chain of housing legislation." Housing Program Embodied in Bills, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30,
1937, at 13.
314 Hearings to Amend the National Housing Act, supra note 290, at 212.
315 Id.
316 See generally Carrozzo, supra note 169, at 799-805.
317 National HousingAct, ch. 847, sec. 2-13, §201-514,52 Stat. 8,8-26 (1938); Text ofAmendments
to National HousingAct as Made Law by President, NYTIMEs, Feb. 5,1938, at 6. For vote counts see Homes
Bill Voted 324-23 by House, NY TIMES, Dec. 9, 1937, at 1; Senate's Version of Housing Voted, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 22, 1937, at 5. One additional amendment reduced the loan-to-value on small loans to 90 percent
of the purchase price, qualifying more Americans for FHA mortgages.
2008]
44 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 17:1
tion ofWashington, D.C., was charted as a subsidiary of the Reconstruction
Finance Corporation.31 The name of this association would be changed two
months later to the Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA) or
Fannie Mae. 319 The new association had an immediate impact. As reported
in the May 28, 1938, issue of The New York Times, "there appears to be a
ready market for this new type of investment."3 20 The initial response to
offerings of Fannie Mae notes by investors was overwhelming.
321
Tellingly, Fannie Mae, in its role as "a discount bank by buying and
selling mortgages from institutions which originate the loans" was changing
the perception of local lending institutions toward mortgages they
originated. 322  Fannie Mae's potential market for mortgages "already is
understood to have modified the inclination of banks to regard as 'surplus'
money many of the mortgages they hold."
323
VIII. THE NEW DEAL FOR THE AMERICAN MORTGAGE
An interesting perspective on what the New Deal achieved in the field
of American mortgages is gained when comparing the philosophies behind
the HOLC, F-IA, and Fannie Mae with those of the Agricultural Adjust-
ment Administration and the National Recovery Administration. The
housing agencies approached mortgage lending from the perspective of
increasing the supply and lowering the price of mortgage money whereas
agencies like the AAA and NRA embraced reducing production to increase
prices. This difference in philosophy was understood at the time. An
editorial in The NewYork Times explained the approach: "[In the field of
housing,] Mr. Roosevelt does not recommend the production of fewer
goods at higher prices. He recommends, instead, the production of more
318 A briefoverview of the charter of this organization is provided in GEN. SERV. ADMIN. NAT'L
ARCHIVES & RECORDS SERV., THE NAT'LARCHIVES, PRELIMINARY INVENTORY OF THE RECORDS OF
THE FEDERAL NATIONAL MORTGAGE ASSOCIATION, (1963) [hereinafter PRELIMINARYINVENTORY].
Jesse H. Jones, chairman of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, announced the organization of
the NMA ofWashington D.C. and its initial capitalization in the amount of$10,000,000. Housing Loan
Body is Set Up by RFC, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 1938, at 3.
319 PRELIMINARY INVENTORY, supra note 318.
320 Lee E. Cooper, FRA Due to Proceed Slowly in Approving Applications for New Mortgage Agencies,
N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 1938, at 25.
321 Id. "[T] he $25,000,000 issue of [2 percent] five-year notes of the Federal National Mortgage
Association was reported to have shown a subscription total of fifty-two times the amount offered." Id.
Fannie Mae purchased $38 million in new FHA mortgages in 1938, its first year of operation. Another
entity, an arm of the Reconstruction Finance Corp., called the RFC Mortgage Company, purchased an
additional $36 million in FHA mortgages that same year. OLSON, supra note 1, at 202.
322 Cooper, supra note 320.
323 Id.
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goods at lower prices." 324 The editorial identified the approach as "a new
phase in the evolution of the New Deal" and "a radical and fundamental...
distinction."
325
An abundance of available mortgage money-in fact, a glut of available
funds-would democratize home ownership for the middle class and
beyond, bringing prosperity to a multitude of Americans. As a corollary,
more borrowers and an overall increase in money loaned meant greater
profits for banks. Beyond democratizing home ownership, more home
owners meant employment in a vast number of supporting industries: home
builders, carpenters, plumbers, electricians, painters, appliance manufac-
turers, salesmen, bankers, appraisers, lawyers-the list goes on.326  This
concept of investment in housing for the purpose of stimulating the entire
United States economy was championed by John Maynard Keynes, the
influential twentieth century British economist. 327  In a 1937 letter to
Franklin Roosevelt, Keynes highlighted the potential of government
investment in housing, calling this approach "the best aid to recovery. 328
The closest relative to the New Deal's mortgage agencies, in terms of
economic philosophy, is the Electric Home and Farm Administration
(EHFA) .329 To help the Tennessee Valley Authority sell electricity in
impoverished Southern towns, the EHFA was created to assist rural families
in buying appliances to create demand for electricity.30 The EHFA worked
by providing inexpensive loans and promoting cheaper prices from
manufacturers.33 So, by subsidizing appliance purchasing, the EHFA was
unlike the anti-deflationary philosophy of most other New Deal agencies.
Interestingly, as historian Jordan Schwarz noted, the EHFA "pioneered
324 Lee E. Cooper, The President's Program, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 1937, at 22.
325 Id.
326 This list is a summary of the numerous building trades, professionals and suppliers who
benefit from the construction, sale, purchase and mortgaging of houses. Really, this list is under-
inclusive. For example, consider contractors, plumbers and electricians: they drive trucks to theirjobs,
thus employing countless persons in the automotive industry. On their way to work, they undoubtedly
go to their favorite deli for breakfast and coffee, thus employing members of the food service industry.
Attorneys and bankers hire secretaries and clerks. Appliance manufacturers hire truck drivers to deliver
the appliances. Truck drivers buy gas, and so on. This principle, called the "Keynesian multiplier," can
go on for volumes, like a continuous news reel from the era. For a straightforward explanation of the
Keynesian multiplier see TODD G. BUCHHOLZ, NEW IDEAS FROM DEAD ECONOMISTS 218-20 (1989).
37 KENNEDY, supra note 1, at 357.
328 Id. at 357-58. In Keynes's own words: "I should advise putting most of your eggs in this
basket." Id.
329 SCHWARZ, supra note 1, at 236. The author calls the EHFA (the brainchild of New Dealer
David Lilienthal) "one of the New Deal's more ingenious public corporations." Id.
330 Id.
331 Id. at 237.
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cheap money" before the FHA championed "lower rates, lower down
payments, lower payments[,] and longer terms to finance home-buying."
332
Ultimately, from 1933 to 1938, the New Deal put in place the
mechanisms for the national mortgage market. The system-wide change
started with relief legislation for defaulting borrowers and failing banks
(under the Home Owners' Loan Corporation). A few farsighted New
Dealers inspired institutional changes in the form of a better mortgage
document, mortgage practices, and insured mortgages (ushered in by the
Federal Housing Administration). As security in the American economy
increased through these changes, liquidity was enhanced when a market was
created for these now safe investments (through Fannie Mae).
Over time, the New Deal's creation of a national mortgage market
infrastructure evolved further. In the late 1940s, the GI Bill allowed
millions of servicemen to enjoy the benefits of nationally traded mortgages,
enjoying less expensive mortgages through enhanced liquidity.33 The
Emergency Home Finance Act of 1970 expanded the national mortgage
market to include all mortgages originated in America, whether from FHA,
Veterans Affairs, or conventional lenders.334 When the pieces were all in
place and millions of Americans wanted their own 40 by 100 piece of
America, mortgage lending was on the verge of the long-promised
democratization of home ownership. 33' The great success of the New Deal
for the American mortgage is clear. In 1929, "four Americans in ten lived in
their own homes."3 6 In 2004, 69 percent of Americans owned their own
home.337  In a five-year period of New Deal legislation, a revolution in
home financing was born.
332 Id. at 239.
333 JACKSON, supra note 16, at 204.
334 For a discussion of this next phase in revolutionizing the American mortgage market see
Carrozzo, supra note 169, at 799-805.
335 KENNEDY, supra note 1, at 370.
336 Id.
337 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICALABSTRACTOFTHE UNITED STATES, (2005), Table 954,
Homeownership Rates by States 1985-2004.
